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Auditors frequently gather inform ation by conducting client inquiries (Bennett
and H atfield 2013; Hirst and K oonce 1996; Trom peter and W right 2010). When clients
are attem pting to hide frauds and irregularities, auditors need to be alert during inquiries
to verbal and nonverbal cues em anating from clients that m ight be indicative of
intentional deception. This dissertation consists o f tw o studies investigating the detection
o f deception in client inquiries. The first study provides a sum m ary o f extant literature
exam ining deception detection, with an emphasis on those studies that have implications
for client inquiries. I propose several avenues for future research that will contribute to
academ ic literature as well as practice. In addition, I exam ine how the use o f computerm ediated com munication to conduct client inquiries m ight im pact the detection o f client
deception. The second study o f this dissertation exam ines an im portant and potentially
problem atic characteristic o f a typical client inquiry; namely, that client inquiries
generally involve a single auditor. The use o f a single auditor to conduct client inquiries
can lim it the ability o f auditors to detect deception. I exam ine how behavioral cues
indicative o f deception (specifically, deceptive clients’ levels o f discussion and
nervousness during inquiries) are affected by the participation o f an additional auditor,
and w hether a dual-auditor team is more likely than a single auditor to detect deception.

The results indicate that the presence o f an additional auditor during client inquiries has a
significant effect on auditors’ perceptions o f the extent to w hich a client participates in
discussion, as well as client nervousness. In addition, my results suggest that dual-auditor
team s are better able to incorporate these deceptive cues into subsequent decisions. This
paper contributes to prior studies on client inquiries and interpersonal deception theory
(B u lleran d Burgoon 1996).
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CH APTER ONE
IN T R O D U C T IO N
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The purpose o f this dissertation is to contribute to knowledge on deception
detection, specifically as it applies to client inquiries. Auditors frequently conduct
inquiries o f client m anagem ent in order to gather inform ation on a host o f com pany
accounts and processes (Bennett and Hatfield 2013). Furthermore, client inquiries are a
useful and often required audit procedure for many phases o f audit fieldwork (Ariail et al.
2010). However, w hile client m anagement can provide a wealth of valuable inform ation
for auditors, auditors m ust be wary o f m anagers w ho might intentionally deceive them to
conceal fraud or other deviant behavior. Professional standards adm onish auditors to
attend to behavioral characteristics o f client personnel that m ay indicate the use o f
deception (AICPA 2002; CICA 2000). U nfortunately, previous research suggests that
individuals are largely unable to discern between truth and deception (Kraut 1980), and
Lee and W elker (2010) provide evidence that auditors are unable to detect deception in a
client inquiry setting at rates significantly greater than chance.
In this dissertation, I examine the detection o f deception during client inquiries in
two ways. First, I identify and summarize relevant studies from the com m unications and
accounting literatures, and suggest future research that will contribute to current
understanding of detecting deception in client inquiries. Second, I conduct an experiment
exam ining how the presence o f two auditors, relative to a single auditor, affects deception
detection in client inquiries. A brief summary o f each study follows.
In the next chapter o f this dissertation, I present a review o f the extant literature
exam ining detection deception. W ith the exception o f Lee and W elker (2010), accounting
researchers have not examined the ability o f auditors to detect deception. Thus, I rely
heavily on the com m unications literature to inform future accounting research on the

subject. A review o f relevant communications studies suggests that individuals perform
poorly when trying to detect deception (Kraut 1980). A major reason for this ineptitude
stems from truth-bias (M cComack and Parks 1986), w hich reflects individuals’
predisposition to believe what they are told. The effects o f truth-bias appear difficult to
overcome, even for trained experts (Burgoon et al. 1994).
The effect o f truth-bias provides deceptive m anagers with an increased
opportunity to deceive auditors during client inquiries, and the effect is detrim ental in
both face-to-face and com puter-mediated environm ents (George et al. 2008b).
Accounting research suggests that auditors are unable to detect deception (Lee and
W elker 2008). Consistent with findings from the com m unications literature, it appeai-s
that experience and training do not improve auditors’ ability to appropriately recognize
and act upon behavioral cues indicating deception (Lee and W elker 2008; 2010; 2011).
Since training does not improve auditors’ ability to detect cues indicative o f deception,
one alternative m ethod o f improving deception detection is to cause the deceptive
behavioral cues o f m anagers to become m ore pronounced, which is the prem ise o f the
second study o f this dissertation.
Chapter three presents an experim ent which exam ines how the presence o f two
auditors in a client inquiry, relative to a single auditor, alters the behavior o f deceptive
controllers. Specifically, I examine auditors’ perceptions o f the extent to w hich
controllers lead discussion during client inquiries, as well as auditors’ perceptions o f
controllers’ nervousness. I find that deceptive controllers meeting w ith single auditors
exhibit increased participation during client inquiries. In addition, I find that deceptive
controllers m eeting w ith two auditors show signs o f increased nervousness. Contrary to

previous research (Lee and W elker 2008; 2010; 2011), I find some evidence that
accounting students are able to detect deception in a client inquiry setting.
Additional analysis reveals that the degree to w hich auditors incorporate
behavioral cues indicative o f deception depends on the num ber o f auditors taking part in
the client inquiry. A s deceptive controllers increase participation during client inquiries,
dual-auditor team s perceive greater deception. In contrast, single auditors perceive less
deception, w hich suggests they may be more easily sw ayed by deceptive controllers.
Furthermore, dual-auditor teams perceive increased controller nervousness as being
indicative o f deception, and incorporate assessm ents o f nervousness into subsequent audit
adjustments. In contrast, single auditors’ perceptions o f controller nervousness do not
affect subsequent audit adjustments. The results suggest some advantages to having two
auditors participate in client inquiries. Future research is needed to exam ine the
circumstances under which the benefits o f having tw o auditors present during client
inquiries outweigh the associated costs.
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CHAPTER TW O
D E T E C T IN G D E C E P T IO N IN C L IE N T IN Q U IR IE S :
A R E V IE W AND IM P L IC A T IO N S F O R F U T U R E R E S E A R C H
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I. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Client inquiries provide a wealth o f inform ation to auditors throughout the audit
process. Nevertheless, the interactive nature o f client inquiries can leave auditors
susceptible to client deception, and therefore requires that auditors exhibit professional
skepticism in order to reduce the likelihood o f being deceived. In this paper, I sum m arize
extant literature on deception as it relates to client inquiries and suggest avenues for
future research.
Professional skepticism , which accounting standards define as “an attitude that
includes a questioning m ind and a critical assessm ent o f audit evidence,” is critical to the
auditing profession (Public Company Accounting O versight Board [PCAOB] 2010a, AU
230.07). In fact, SAS No. 1 (American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants [AICPA]
1997) specifies that professional skepticism is a requirem ent o f due professional care
(PCAOB 2010a, A U 230.07). Recent reports by the PCAOB indicate that audit
deficiencies and audit failures are the result o f a lack o f professional skepticism (PCAOB
2008; 2012c), w hich im plies that audit firms should endeavor to promote the use of
professional skepticism by their personnel.
The PCAOB further states that “while professional skepticism is important in all
aspects o f the audit, it is particularly important in those areas o f the audit that involve
significant ju d g m e n t...” Furthermore, the PCAOB asserts that “professional skepticism is
also im portant as it relates to the auditor’s consideration o f fraud in the audit” (PCAOB
2012c, 3-4). As I dem onstrate in the following section, many areas o f the audit that most
require professional skepticism are particularly w ell-suited to the use o f client inquiries,
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which occur when audit personnel meet with m em bers o f client m anagem ent or other
employees to gather additional information pertaining to the audit.
The need for professional skepticism during client inquiries is particularly high
because there are som e instances when client m anagem ent m ight purposefully mislead
auditors in an effort to conceal questionable activities. Professional guidance advises
accountants to attend to managem ent or em ployees’ behavioral characteristics during
inquiries that may indicate the use o f deception, including both the client’s verbal
responses and physical behavior (AICPA 2002; C IC A 2000). However, m ost auditors
have not been trained to detect deception. Furtherm ore, several studies outside o f the
audit setting indicate that individuals generally perform poorly when trying to detect
deception in face-to-face communication (M iller and S tiff 1993), and one study suggests
that auditors are no exception (Lee and W elker 2008). Perhaps the PC A O B ’s findings o f
insufficient skepticism on the part o f auditors (PCAOB 2008; 2012c) are further evidence
that auditors are unable to determ ine when m anagem ent is being deceptive.
Given the im portance o f deception detection to the audit, and the few related
studies appearing in the literature, further research is called for. The purpose o f this paper
is twofold. First, I provide a synthesis o f academic literature that has exam ined deception
detection, with an em phasis on those studies that have implications for client inquiries,
and suggest research topics that can be examined to further extant knowledge. Second, I
examine a recent phenom enon o f the auditing environm ent; i.e., that client
com munications are increasingly being conducted v ia electronic media. Therefore, this
paper also exam ines how the use o f com puter-m ediated com munication to conduct client
inquiries may change deception and its detection.
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The rem ainder o f this paper is organized as follow s: The next section presents a
brief summary o f the auditing standards governing client inquiries. Section III discusses
the major findings on general deception detection from the com munications literature,
and section IV reviews relevant studies on detecting deception in the accounting literature
as it relates to the auditing profession. In section V, I discuss how the increased use o f
computer-mediated com m unication in the audit field m ay affect the ability o f auditors to
detect deception, and I conclude in the final section.
II.

C L IE N T IN Q U IR IE S

The use o f client inquiries is common practice in the audit profession and can be
used to gather inform ation throughout the audit. The A ICPA dictates that auditors m ust
comply with three standards o f fieldwork w hen conducting an audit; namely, audit work
must be appropriately planned, auditors must gain an understanding o f the client’s
internal controls, and auditors m ust gather sufficient evidence on w hich to base the audit
opinion (PCAOB 2010b, AU 150). Ariail et al. (2010) describe how client inquiries play
a critical role in the auditor’s ability to comply w ith all three standards o f fieldwork.
Below, I give a b rief synopsis o f the accounting standards governing the use o f client
inquiries.
The first standard o f fieldwork, which regards planning the audit, entails
establishing an overall strategy that will guide the developm ent o f the audit plan
(PCAOB 2012a, AS 9.8). The nature and extent o f planning activities is contingent on
several factors; including previous knowledge o f the client’s internal controls, econom ic
conditions affecting the client’s industry, and changes in the client’s operations (PCAOB
2012a, AS 9.7). Though not explicitly required for general planning purposes, client

inquiries can be a valuable source o f information for auditors as they complete the initial
audit planning.
Another im portant function o f client inquiries during the planning process relates
to identifying and assessing the risk o f material m isstatem ents. The PCAOB requires that
the auditor make inquiries to the audit committee, m anagem ent, internal auditors, and
other employees regarding the potential for material misstatem ents, including those that
are the result o f fraud (PCAOB 2010c, AS 12.54). T hese inquiries are to include
questions related to em ployees’ knowledge o f actual, alleged, or suspected fraud; the
identification o f fraud risks, and the controls utilized by the client to address fraud
(PCAOB 2010c, AS 12.55-12.57). The information gathered during these inquiries is
another important input to the audit planning process.
The second standard o f fieldwork states that the auditor m ust gain a sufficient
understanding o f internal controls to both plan the audit and determine the nature, timing,
and extent o f audit tests to be performed (PCAOB 2010b, AU 150). According to the
PCAOB, client inquiries can be useful for the auditor in determining w hether an internal
control is designed effectively, and whether the internal control has been appropriately
im plemented (PCAOB 2010c, AS 12.20). In addition, inquiries may assist auditors as
they perform w alkthroughs, which can enable auditors to understand the processing o f
com pany transactions (PCAOB 2010c, AS 12.37).
According to the third and final standard o f fieldwork, auditors need to gather
sufficient evidence to support an audit opinion. Governing standards state that evidence
can be gathered through “inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirm ations” (PCAOB
2010b, AU 150, em phasis added). W hile the use o f inquiries is beneficial to auditors

during many phases o f the audit, it is perhaps most useful as auditors collect audit
evidence on which to base an audit opinion. Often, the collection o f audit evidence can
lead to questions or concerns related to account balances and audit assertions. In these
instances, it may be necessary to talk to the client to gain increased understanding and
clarity. In the case o f com plex m anagem ent judgm ents, unusual transactions, and changes
to a com pany’s operations; speaking with the client m ight be the only way for auditors to
gain a sufficient understanding o f the client’s business and conduct a comprehensive
audit.
Previous research in accounting has not directly exam ined the extent to which
auditors make use o f client inquiries, although there are a few studies that suggest such
inquiries occur frequently. For instance, Bennett and H atfield (2013) examine how the
social mismatch between inexperienced audit staff and client management affects the
audit process. A ccording to their study, staff-level auditors report that “86 percent o f the
respondents met w ith m anagem ent at least three to five days per week during a typical
w eek o f fieldwork, and 37 percent claimed to have m et with client management every
day” (p. 32). In addition, H irst and Koonce (1996) and Trom peter and W right (2010)
suggest that auditors com m only approach client m anagem ent for explanations when
analytical procedures reveal potential discrepancies in a firm ’s financial statements.
Inquiries o f this nature are particularly important for the client because they provide an
opportunity to influence and persuade the auditor that additional audit w ork is not
required. If successful, clients can gain a significant advantage in subsequent auditorclient negotiations (Salterio 2012), as well as reduce or avoid subsequent audit
adjustments.
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Unfortunately for auditors, management m ay be able to deceive auditors during
client inquiries in a way that sim ply would not be possible if auditors relied solely on the
exam ination o f financial records and other audit procedures. In general, people have a
tendency to believe what they are told. This phenom enon is know n as “truth-bias”
(M cCornack and Parks 1986). It is reasonable to assum e that the overwhelming majority
o f client communications do not involve deception, w hich m ay make it difficult for
auditors to be sufficiently skeptical during client inquiries. G aining a better understanding
o f deception and its detection m ight be one way to address the PC A O B ’s concern over
auditors’ lack o f professional skepticism (PCAOB 2008; 2012c). The academic literature
on deception is concentrated in the field o f com munications; I review this literature in the
following section. Because I am interested in the im plications o f deception research
specifically as they relate to client inquiries, I focus m y review on deception in face-toface contexts.
III. G E N E R A L F IN D IN G S O N D E T E C T IN G D E C E P T IO N IN F A C E -T O -F A C E
C O N T EX TS

Evidence on Individuals’ Ability to Detect Deception
Researchers generally agree that people do not perform well when attempting to
distinguish between truth and lie. In a meta-analysis, K raut (1980) finds that the mean
accuracy rate o f distinguishing between truth and lie is only about 57 percent, which is
only slightly better than a random choice. However, there are a few exceptions, as
research has shown that certain individuals do have significantly greater deception
detection ability than the average person.

Training
Researchers have found that training can im prove deception detection. For
instance, deTurck and M iller (1990) trained some individuals to look for certain
behavioral cues that indicate deception. They report the highest accuracy rates for trained
detectors judging low-skilled deceivers, and the low est accuracy rates for untrained
detectors judging high-skilled deceivers. They also find that trained detectors can more
accurately predict the accuracy o f their own judgm ents (i.e., trained detectors had a
sm aller discrepancy betw een their certainty o f judgm ent accuracy and actual accuracy,
relative to untrained detectors). In a sim ilar study, Fiedler and W alka (1993) asked
participants to judge the veracity o f a series o f reports on m inor delinquency. Participants
either were or were not given inform ation about specific nonverbal cues to deception. In
addition, some participants received performance feedback. The results o f the study
dem onstrate higher detection accuracy rates for individuals who received information
regarding deception cues and feedback. Overall, the results o f deTurck and M iller (1990)
and Fiedler and W alka (1993) provide some evidence that training can improve deception
detection.
Professional Experience
There is also some evidence to suggest that individuals with considerable
professional experience detecting deception may exhibit im proved deception detection
rates. Ekman and O ’Sullivan (1991) used an experiment to exam ine whether certain
groups o f individuals, based on their professional experience, were m ore likely to detect
deception than the average person. Their work was m otivated in part by the fact that most
previous studies exam ining deception detection used only student participants. The
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authors’ participant pool consisted prim arily o f “professional lie-catchers;” including
m em bers o f the U.S. Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau o f
Investigation, and California police and judges. In addition to professional lie-catchers,
they also examined psychiatrists, college students, and adults w orking in various
professions.
Participants o f their experim ent were shown ten one-m inute clips from videotaped
interview s that portrayed individuals answering questions about a film they were
watching. Participants o f the experim ent were told that about h a lf o f the people in these
film s w ould be lying. The results show that members o f the U.S. Secret Service perform
significantly higher than other occupational groups, w hich contradicts earlier studies that
show no difference in detection perform ance, relative to chance, for occupational groups
with a special interest in deception.
In a similar study, Ekm an et al. (1999) find that the ability to detect deception is
not lim ited to specialized m em bers o f law enforcement. The authors studied two groups
o f law-enforcement officers and one group o f clinical psychologists, all o f whom had a
special interest or skill in detecting deception. These groups were com pared w ith groups
o f law-enforcement officers and psychologists who did not have a special interest in
deception. All participants were shown videos o f individuals sharing their opinions on
controversial social issues. Participants were asked to assess w hether the individuals
shown in the video were telling the truth or lying. The results o f the study show that
professional groups with a special interest in deception have detection accuracy rates
significantly higher than chance.
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These results should be considered with caution, for w hile there are a few studies
that suggest that training or professional experience can result in im proved deception
detection, the majority o f studies do not show significantly higher detection ability for
experts. For example, in m eta-analyses performed by A am odt and Custer (2006) and
Bond and DePaulo (2006), expertise is reported to have a non-significant effect on
detection accuracy. In addition, researchers generally agree that people perform very
poorly when trying to distinguish between truth and lie. Even for individuals with
training or professional experience, accuracy rates for detecting deception are typically
below 75 percent (Levine et al. 1999). This begs the question, w hy are people so bad at
detecting deception?

Cues to Deception
One reason that may explain the generally poor perform ance in detection
accuracy rates is that behavioral cues that indicate deception are not well understood, nor
are they easily detected. Ekman and O ’Sullivan (1991) m ention that perhaps the reason
w hy m any studies find poor accuracy detection rates is that there is seldom any evidence
in these studies that the behavior o f deceivers differs from that o f truth-tellers. In the most
extensive meta-analysis to date on deceptive cues, DePaulo et al. (2003) report relatively
few differences in the nonverbal behavior o f deceivers, relative to truth-tellers; and
existing differences are very small. Thus, it is likely very difficult for people who focus
on nonverbal deceptive cues to discern truth from lie. DePaulo et al. (2003) do suggest
that deceivers are more likely to m ake a negative impression on receivers, and are also
seen as m ore tense. However, the differences in verbal deceptive cues can be more
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pronounced. Research shows that deceivers tend to be less forthcom ing than truth-tellers,
and provide fewer details in their argum ents (DePaulo et al. 2003).
Perhaps one o f the m ost significant findings o f DePaulo et al. (2003) is that the
experimental context is an im portant factor in detecting deception. The authors find that
deceptive cues are more evident w hen deceivers are m otivated to succeed, and that
identity-relevant motivations (e.g., maintaining a good reputation) are more effective than
m onetary motivations in inducing deceptive cues. Thus, it is feasible that in previous
studies where participants were offered no reward for a successful detection, or penalty
for unsuccessful deception, there were no apparent differences in deceptive cues between
deceivers and truth-tellers. Furtherm ore, DePaulo et al. (2003) find that deceptive cues
becom e more pronounced when deceivers are discussing transgressions rather than more
trivial matters. Thus, it appears that individuals need to feel a sufficient level o f stress or
physiological arousal before deceptive cues become manifest.

Truth-Bias
Another potential reason for low detection accuracy rates m ay be individuals’
apparent predisposition to believe w hat they are being told. Thus, even if people can
correctly identify and interpret deceptive cues, they m ay still have a tendency to accept
lies as truth. This phenom enon has been identified as truth-bias (M cC om ack and Parks
1986). Before the now-classic study o f M cCom ack and Parks (1986), it was thought that
detection accuracy between individuals w ould increase as they becam e more familiar
w ith each another. However, M cC om ack and Parks posited that as familiarity grows,
individuals gain confidence in their ability to detect deception, w hich leads to an increase
in truth-bias and a decrease in detection accuracy. To test their hypotheses, M cComack
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and Parks designed an experiment utilizing pairs of individuals. One m em ber o f each pair
m ade a series o f truthful and deceptive statements that was recorded. The second member
o f the pair judged the veracity o f the first m em ber’s statements. The results indicate that
increases in relational development lead to increases in truth-bias.
U sing a series o f experiments, Levine et al. (1999) report a significant truth-bias
in various settings. Their results suggest that the single best predictor o f detection
accuracy is the veracity o f judged statements. Thus, it appears that one o f the effects of
truth-bias is that accuracy rates tend to be significantly higher than 50 percent when
participants are judging true statements, and significantly low er than 50 percent when
judging deceptive statements. Their results have implications for research on deception,
as studies that do not control for truth-lie base rates m ay result in distorted detection
accuracy rates.
Burgoon et al. (1994) provide evidence that even experts are susceptible to truthbias. The authors use an experiment to com pare truth-bias using a group o f adult novices1
and a second group o f experts (military intelligence instructors and related military
personnel). Participants interviewed strangers and acquaintances during which
interview ees responded w ith deceptive and truthful answers. Participants were then asked
to determ ine when interviewees were lying or telling the truth. The results show that,
sim ilar to M cCom ack and Parks (1986), participants exhibit higher levels of truth-bias
for acquaintances than for strangers. These results hold for both novices and experts.
Som ew hat surprisingly, B urgoon et al. (1994) report that the accuracy rates o f novices
were actually higher than those o f experts.

1The term novice refers to an individual’s lack o f experience in detecting deception, as opposed to their
lack o f experience with the setting and other contextual factors of a particular task.

Buller et al. (1991b) find that the effects o f truth-bias are particularly strong for
face-to-face communicators. Using an experimental design, the authors com pared the
detection accuracy o f individuals who participated in interviews w ith those who watched
prerecorded interviews. Specifically, one group o f participants was asked to conduct two
interviews in w hich the interviewee either lied or told the truth. These interviews were
videotaped, and were later viewed by a second group o f participants. The results indicate
that those individuals who take part in face-to-face com m unications exhibit increased
truth-bias and decreased accuracy, relative to participants who w atch recordings o f the
interviews. The results suggest that the strength o f persuasion and/or cues to deception
m ay be contingent on the medium o f communication.

The Effect o f Suspicion on Truth-Bias and Detection Accuracy
The presence o f suspicion, w hich can be likened to skepticism, is fundamental to
the process o f detecting deception. A fter all, it is necessary for individuals to be at least
m inim ally suspicious in order to make a truth/lie judgm ent (M cCom ack and Parks 1986).
Several studies have examined whether suspicion can offset individuals’ propensity to
trust those w ith w hom they are com municating. However, for suspicion to be useful in
detecting deception, suspicion m ust do m ore than simply reduce truth-bias; it must also
im prove detection accuracy. For exam ple, it is possible for individuals to be overly
suspicious, and to assume that statements are false unless proven otherwise. Such
individuals would not exhibit truth-bias, but might nonetheless have low detection
accuracy rates.
Toris and DePaulo (1985) conduct an experiment in which h a lf o f their
interview ers are alerted the possibility that interviewees might be engaging in deception.
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Their results suggest that those interviewers who were primed to be suspicious are more
likely to rate interviewees as being deceptive, relative to interviewers who are not
primed; thus, truth-bias appears to be reduced by suspicion. However, the authors note
that prim ing interviewers to be suspicious does not im prove detection accuracy rates.
Interestingly, interviewees (both deceivers and truth-tellers) reported feeling less
persuasive w hen interviewed by interviewers who were prim ed to be suspicious.
In a sim ilar study examining relational partners, S tiff et al. (1992) find that the
increase in truth-bias exhibited between partners in well-developed relationships is
attenuated by suspiciousness. Specifically, when participants receive negative
inform ation regarding the potential veracity o f their partner’s m essage from a third party,
they are m ore likely to abandon truth-bias (i.e. make greater judgm ents o f deceptiveness)
than participants who do not receive such information. However, and in keeping with
Toris and DePaulo (1985), skepticism does not appear to improve individuals’ ability to
detect deception.
M cC om ack and Levine (1990) posit that the lack o f results regarding suspicion
and detection accuracy is the result o f researchers’ methods o f operationalizing suspicion
(i.e., suspicion is m odeled as dichotomous variable). As noted earlier, individuals are
generally trusting and typically exhibit a truth-bias, w hich reduces detection accuracy.
W hen individuals are primed to be suspicious, they abandon their truth-bias, and may
adopt a lie-bias, w hich also reduces detection accuracy. For this reason, M cC om ack and
Levine (1990) predict a non-linear effect o f suspicion on detection accuracy; such that a
moderate level o f suspiciousness, one w hich avoids both truth-bias and lie-bias, may
im prove detection accuracy.

To study their hypothesized relationship, relational partners were recruited to take
part in a controlled experiment. One partner was videotaped making a series o f
statements that were either truthful or deceptive, after w hich the second partner viewed
the videotape and judged the veracity o f these statements. No inform ation regarding the
possibility o f deception was given to participants in the low-suspicion condition.
Participants in the moderate-suspicion condition were told that their partners “m ay not be
com pletely truthful.” In the high-suspicion condition, participants were told that their
partners w ould definitely be lying on several o f the recorded items. Results o f the study
dem onstrate that individuals in the m oderate-suspicion condition were found to have the
highest rates o f detection accuracy, w hich supports the non-linear relationship between
suspicion and detection accuracy predicted by M cCom ack and Levine (1990).
Furthermore, the authors provide evidence that both situationally-aroused suspicion
(manipulated by experimental treatments) and a predisposition tow ard being suspicious
(an inherent trait) significantly influence detection accuracy.
Table 1 presents a summary o f the studies discussed in this section. The next
section discusses academic studies that have exam ined deception detection from an
accounting perspective.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
IV , D E T E C T IN G D E C E P T IO N IN C L IE N T IN Q U IR IE S
There is a paucity o f auditing research exam ining deception detection in face-toface settings, w hich is somewhat surprising given the im portance o f client inquiries to the
audit. Extant literature in accounting and auditing provide practical guidance for how
auditors should conduct client inquiries, and empirical evidence on the ability o f auditors

to detect deception. In this section, I summarize these studies and suggest areas for future
research.

Practical Guidance
As referenced previously, Ariail et al. (2010) provide a thorough sum m ary o f the
use o f client inquiries during the audit process. W hereas the current review aims to
provide recom m endations for future research on detecting deception in client inquiries,
Ariail et al. draw from research to make several practical suggestions for auditors’ use of
client inquiries. They issue four useful guidelines w hich I will summarize. First, no single
behavior indicates deception. Thus, auditors need to be wary o f focusing in on a single
specific behavior and instead evaluate interviewees on a more holistic basis. Second,
auditors should listen to what a person says, instead o f focusing on how he or she looks
when saying it. The reason for this recom m endation is that it may be easier to detect
verbal cues to deception relative to non-verbal cues (DePaulo et al. 2003). Third, because
verbal cues m ay be an auditor’s best chance to detect deception, auditors should allow
interviewees am ple opportunity to talk. This can be accomplished through the use o f
open-ended questions. Finally, auditors should make an effort to com pare interview ees’
statements to other sources o f reliable information, as this m ay im prove the likelihood
that auditors detect deception.
The audit profession can greatly benefit from additional research on deception
detection. Below, I present relevant studies in auditing and discuss how research from the
com m unications literature may provide insight for future w ork related to detecting
detection in client inquiries. W hile the com m unications literature certainly informs
auditors regarding general strategies o f deception, the dynamics o f an audit m ay be very

different to the contexts studied previously, especially when client personnel are highly
incentivized to convince auditors o f their point o f view . The potentially adversarial
relationship between auditors and their clients could have a significant effect on
deception and its detection and therefore m erits additional research.

Detecting Deception in Non-Interactive Environments
Early em pirical studies on auditors’ ability to detect deception utilize client
inquiry settings but rem ove the interactive context innate to auditor-client
communication. These studies examine w hether auditors (and other “accounting
interviewers”) can detect deception at rates higher than chance, and how deception
detection might be im proved through training or experience.
Training
Lee and W elker (2007) conduct two experim ents and find that accounting
students are not successful when attempting to uncover deception in a client inquiry.
Based on the results o f Buller et al. (1991b) that suggest that deception detection
improves for passive observers relative to interview participants, accounting students
were asked to view videotapes o f participants either lying or telling the truth about the
value o f real estate properties. The authors find some evidence that the act o f taking part
in a client inquiry m ay negate truth-bias. Perhaps the dynam ics o f a client inquiry may
induce some level o f suspicion or skepticism
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the part o f interviewers. However, the

results o f the experim ent suggest that accounting interviewers are unable to detect
deception (i.e., detection accuracy is not significantly greater than chance) in a client
inquiry setting even when acting as passive observers. Thus, their results are consistent
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with those o f previous studies in the field o f com m unications (Stiff et ai. 1992; Toris and
DePaulo 1985).
In their second experiment, Lee and W elker (2007) analyze w hether training in
deception detection significantly increases detection accuracy. H alf o f the experimental
participants were asked to watch a training video produced by the ACFE on com m on
behavioral cues exhibited by deceivers. Detection rates o f those who received training
were com pared to a control group which received no training. Results o f the study
indicate that detection accuracy rates are not significantly higher for participants who
viewed the training video.
Professional Experience
An additional experim ent conducted by Lee and W elker (2008) is the only study
o f which I am aware that analyzes the deception detection accuracy o f professional
auditors. Sim ilar to the authors’ previous study (Lee and W elker 2007), research
participants were asked to view a video o f an interviewee who described the condition of
real estate properties. The interviewee either did or did not describe the property
accurately. A fter view ing the video, participants w ere asked to identify the behaviors
exhibited by the interview ee during the interview. The purpose o f this identification was
to determine w hether professional auditors use different cues in their deception
judgm ents, relative to accounting students. Results o f the analysis indicate that physical
cues indicating anxiety tend to make accounting students more suspicious, although they
have no effect on professional auditors. There are no other significant differences in the
use o f behavioral cues between the groups. Lee and W elker (2008) indicate that the
ability o f professional auditors to detect deception is equivalent to that o f accounting
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students, and that neither auditors nor accounting students can detect deception at rates
significantly higher than chance. The results o f the study suggest that experience does
little to alter auditors’ interpretation o f deceptive cues. M ore importantly, professional
experience does not appear to increase auditors’ ability to detect deception.
Suggestions fo r Future Research
Additional research is necessary to determ ine w hether certain types o f training or
experience affect deception detection in auditors. F o r instance, future research can
examine w hich deceptive cues, or types o f perceived cues (see Lee and W elker 2010),
improve deception detection. A greater understanding o f the verbal and nonverbal cues
currently used by auditors, particularly those who have high rates o f detection, could be
beneficial in developing deception detection training. Ekm an and O ’Sullivan (1991) and
Ekman et al. (1999) report some evidence that individuals with considerable professional
experience have im proved deception detection abilities. It may be the case that although
the average auditor is unable to detect deception at a rate greater than 50 percent (Lee and
W elker 2010), certain specialized auditors, such as forensic investigators, may have
sufficient experience to detect deception during client inquiries. Future research is needed
to determine the benefits o f such experience.
The prim ary result from communication research regarding truth-bias is that as a
relationship grows stronger, so does truth-bias (M cCom ack and Parks 1986; S tiff et al.
1992). This result has im portant implications for the auditor-client relationship. Does
truth-bias increase w ith auditor tenure? Perhaps o f special interest to the auditing
profession is the effect o f client power on truth-bias. For example, do auditors exhibit a
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higher degree o f truth-bias w hen their respective offices are m ore dependent on client
fees?
Auditors are expected to exhibit professional skepticism. Thus, future research is
also needed to determ ine the effects o f professional training and experience on
skepticism, and the relationship between skepticism and auditors’ susceptibility to truthbias. Lee and W elker (2007) provide some evidence that a client inquiry setting negates
truth-bias, perhaps because it induces a sense o f professional skepticism in interviewers.
However, skepticism does not appear to improve detection accuracy rates, which is very
much in keeping w ith the com munications literature (S tiff et al. 1992; Toris and DePaulo
1985). Is there an optim al am ount o f professional skepticism that should be adopted by
auditors prior to client inquiries? M cCornack and Levine (1990) suggest that individuals
with a moderate level o f suspicion exhibit greater detection accuracy, relative to
individuals w ith either a truth-bias or a lie-bias. In a sim ilar vein, should auditors exhibit
a moderate level o f professional skepticism, neither assum ing innocence nor guilt? SAS
No. 1 (AICPA 1997) seem s to suggest that this is the optimal approach, as “it does not
assume any bias ex ante” (Nelson 2009).
Finally, the results o f future research may shed light onto the process o f prim ing
auditors to be appropriately skeptical during, and following, client inquiries. W hile audit
firms may be able to increase “state” , or situationally-aroused, suspicion through priming,
training, or contextual factors o f the client inquiry, there is some evidence that some
people display an increased level o f suspicion as a trait. Levine and M cCornack refer to
“generalized com m unication suspicion” as a “predisposition toward believing that the
messages produced by others are deceptive” (Levine and M cComack 1991, 328). How
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does an innate suspicion translate into auditors’ abilities to exhibit professional
skepticism? In addition, how might audit firms utilize individuals with this skepticism
trait to make the audit process more effective?

Detecting Deception in Interactive Environments
Other w ork by Lee and W elker (2010; 2011), as well as the next chapter o f this
dissertation, exam ines deception detection in a setting with greater interaction. In these
studies, interviewers and interviewees converse face-to-face rather than interviewers
viewing prerecorded responses via video. In addition, these studies exam ine how
exposure to com munication styles and behavioral cues affect auditors’ ability to detect
deception.
Auditor Exposure to Truth-Telling
Lee and W elker (2011) exam ine whether interview ers’ detection accuracy
improves as they becom e fam iliar w ith the behavioral cues exhibited by interviewees
when they are telling the truth. The paper is m otivated in part by recom m endations from
the Association o f Certified Fraud Examiners (A CFE) that interviewers “calibrate”
interviewees’ behavior at the com mencement o f interviews. According to the ACFE,
interviewers m ust rem em ber that interviews can cause stress for interviewees - even
those who are telling the truth (ACFE 2012). The process o f calibration entails observing
the behavior o f interview ees when they answ er questions truthfully at reduced levels o f
stress. This can be accom plished by asking interviewees “noncritical questions on
background inform ation, place o f employment, and the like” (ACFE 2012, 3.240).
Observing interview ees in this context may enable interview ers to detect the changes in
interviewee behavior w hen they are questioned about potential misdeeds or deception.
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The participants used in this study were accounting students. The authors assess
the effectiveness o f calibration by allowing one group o f interviewers to take part in five
preliminary interviews prior to a “focal interview,” in which interviewers were asked to
assess deception. D uring the preliminary interviews, interviewees were instructed to
answer all questions truthfully, w hich provided interview ers w ith the opportunity to
become familiar w ith the behavioral cues exhibited b y their interviewee when telling the
truth. Results suggest that calibration o f an interview ee’s truth-telling increases
interview er’s ability to detect truth. However, calibration does not significantly affect
interviewers’ ability to detect lies in a client inquiry setting. In practice, auditors often
interact with client personnel on a daily basis. Presum ably, the vast majority o f these
interactions do not involve deception. The results o f Lee and W elker (2011) suggest that
familiarity with a client’s truth-telling does not im prove auditors’ ability to accurately
detect deception, w hich is o f great concern to auditors.
Auditor Exposure to White Lies
Lee and W elker (2010) exam ine whether exposure to an interview ee’s w hite lies
can increase interview ers’ rate o f deception detection accuracy. In their experiment,
interviewers were allow ed to grow familiar w ith interview ees’ behavioral cues during a
series o f inform al interviews taking place during the course o f a ten-week period. During
interviews, interviewees w ere random ly assigned to tell the truth or lie about a series o f
personal opinions and experiences. Following the interview ees’ narratives, interviewers
were asked to assess the veracity o f interviewee statem ents, and subsequently received
feedback on their perform ance, w hich enabled interviewers to gain familiarity with
interview ees’ deceptive cues. At the end o f the ten-w eek period, interviewers, along with
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their assigned interviewees, took part in a final, interactive interview, which was more
akin to a client inquiry.
Results o f the experim ent suggest that auditors who are exposed to interview ees’
w hite lies (those related to personal opinions or experiences) can improve their ability to
detect white lies over time. However, this exposure does not appear to increase auditors’
ability to detect deception in a client inquiry setting. Thus, the ability of auditors to detect
deception m ay depend on com munication context.
The Use o f M ultiple A uditors D uring Client Inquiries
The results o f Lee and W elker (2010; 2011) suggest that previous exposure to
behavioral cues indicating truth-telling and deception does not result in improved
deception detection. The next chapter o f this dissertation presents an experim ent that
examines how an additional auditor might make these cues m ore prevalent; namely,
w hether the presence o f a second auditor in a client inquiry affects senders’
com m unication strategy and exhibited leakage. The results indicate that both sender
communication strategy and leakage are contingent on whether senders are questioned by
single auditors or dual-auditor teams. Moreover, the results o f the next chapter suggest
that dual-auditor team s are better able to incorporate senders’ verbal and non-verbal
behaviors into subsequent judgm ents. Specifically, com pared to single auditors, dual
auditor teams are not as easily persuaded by increased sender discussion and are more
cognizant o f how sender nervousness m ay indicate deception.
Suggestions fo r Future Research
Future research could exam ine whether calibration is effective at improving
deception in a high-stakes setting. Calibration is only successful when there is a
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noticeable change in behavior between a low-stress, baseline state, and a high-stress,
deceptive state. Previous studies m ay not have produced the stress necessary to induce
behavioral changes (Ekm an 1985). Future research can utilize different incentives or
other contextual variables (e.g., multiple receivers) to m ake deceptive cues more
noticeable to auditors.
Future research could also examine how the varied participation o f multiple
auditors affects deception detection. For instance, h ow might detection accuracy be
affected if one auditor actively participated in discussion while the other served as an
observer? Although this practice is not used in a typical audit, it is com mon practice in
investigative interviews where deception and other em ployee deviance or misdeeds is
suspected. M arett and George (2004) propose that it m ay be m ore difficult for a sender to
successfully m onitor and respond to multiple receivers w ith varying levels of
participation, though to my know ledge, their conjecture has yet to be tested.
Buller et al. (1991b) have shown that non-participant observers have higher
detection accuracy rates than interview participants. However, the interactive nature o f
client inquiries is inadequately m odeled by the viewing o f prerecorded client responses.
Furthermore, it may be im practical for auditors to record client inquiries. Because
detecting deception appears to be context dependent (Lee and W elker 2010), future
accounting research should continue to examine deception detection in interactive
contexts, which m ost closely approxim ates a client inquiry setting.
Table 2 presents a sum m ary o f the studies discussed in this section. In this and the
previous sections, I presented relevant research from the com munications and accounting
literature as it relates to detecting deception in face-to-face settings. The following

section examines how the increasing use o f com puter-m ediated com munication in
today’s auditing environm ent may change deception and its detection.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
V. D E T E C T IN G D E C E P T IO N IN C O M P U T E R -M E D IA T E D
C O M M U N IC A T IO N

Changes in the Audit Environment
The use o f com puter-m ediated com m unication (e.g., em ails and instant
m essaging) in businesses has drastically increased in recent years. Audit firms are no
exception. The increasing use o f com puter-mediated com m unications is especially
evident in the newest generation o f auditors. In their research exam ining on-the-job
learning in the audit profession, W estermann et al. (2013) interview 30 audit partners
from a Big-4 firm. The partners’ com m ents shed light on how computer-mediated
com munication is changing the process o f client inquiries. Said one partner:
“ I was shocked one day a num ber o f years ago to find out that the staff was
emailing the controller questions. I ju st never thought o f it. O f course you know
there was no email when I was doing that stu ff and so if you needed information
the only way you got it was to talk to them. They knew that too and it was pretty
w idely accepted that you had an open door you ju st kind o f walked by and if they
were there, you would ask them the question. O r in some cases you stored your
questions up and you had a certain time every day that you went by and went
through these things. I m ay be wrong but I d o n ’t think you learn as well through
electronic com m unication w ith your client. Y ou learn through conversation”
(W estermann et al. 2013, 33).
The comments o f a second partner speak to how com puter-m ediated communication may
lim it auditors’ ability to practice professional skepticism, w hich is critical to the client
inquiry process:
"The part I don’t like [about IT] is where the staff or senior sits there w ith an
IPod...and they e-mail their questions to the client about w hat they want or don’t
understand and the client e-mails back to them and they are about eight feet away

from each other. This face-to-face probing discussion skepticism that needs to be
in the auditor’s m indset w hen he or she is conducting the audit, I think you lose a
lot o f that” (W estermann et al. 2013, 33).
The use o f electronic m edia to conduct client inquiries undoubtedly creates a
substantially different com m unicative context than a traditional, face-to-face
environment. O f interest to the current paper is how the use o f computer-mediated
com munication will affect auditors’ ability to detect client deception. The directional
effect o f computer-mediated com m unication on deception detection is not necessarily
intuitive. On the one hand, the use o f com puter-mediated com m unication may increase
deception detection. After all, there is evidence to suggest that passive observers are
better able to detect deception than participants o f face-to-face com munications (Buller et
al. 1991b), perhaps because the lack o f interaction limits the ability o f deceivers to
influence receiver judgm ents. In a sim ilar manner, deceptive clients may not have the
sam e opportunity to influence auditors w ithout face-to-face interaction, w hich may
im prove auditors’ detection abilities.
O n the other hand, receivers o f com puter-mediated com m unication are not
equivalent to passive observers because they are the intended recipients o f the senders’
messages and are expected to respond. The leaner context o f computer-mediated
com m unication may hinder auditors because it limits their ability to perceive several
behavioral cues associated with deception which are only observable in richer contexts
(e.g., fidgeting or pupil dilation, see DePaulo et al. 2003). In addition, auditors should
keep in mind that the use o f com puter-m ediated com munications m ay provide deceptive
clients “w ith greater control o f com m unication behavior and forethought, as well as with
m ore time to plan, rehearse, and edit their messages before submitting them ” (Zhou and

Zhang 2006, 143). In other words, because immediate response is not expected in
com puter-m ediated communications, a deceptive client can take his or her time to
carefully craft a deceptive message. W hile this conjecture would apply prim arily to
email, instant messaging and other synchronous forms o f com puter-m ediated
com m unication also provide a lag betw een sender-receiver communications.
Research on deception in com puter-mediated com m unications is still in its
infancy, and few studies are relevant to client inquiries; nevertheless, these studies
provide important implications for the auditing profession. A ccordingly, I present the
findings o f recent studies and suggest how they can infonn future research related to
conducting client inquiries via electronic media. I summarize these findings in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here]

H ow Communication Medium Affects Deception Detection
Daft and Lengel (1986, 560) define inform ation richness as “the ability o f
inform ation to change understanding w ithin a time interval.” Richness depends on a
num ber o f factors, including the num ber o f informational cues that a medium allows as
well the im mediacy o f feedback that a medium can provide. Face-to-face communication
is the richest medium and provides a host o f cues that receivers can use to better
understand a conveyed m essage (D aft and Lengel 1986). Text-based m edia such as email
are m uch leaner because they do not provide the receiver w ith visual or audio cues and
feedback m ay not be im mediate (Lee et al. 2009).
Carlson and George (2004) analyze how senders and receivers o f deceptive
com m unication may use m edia richness to their advantage. To assess the media preferred
by deceptive senders, the authors presented participants w ith a business scenario that
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required a deceptive act. Participants were then asked which o f several m edia they would
use to carry out the deception. Participants were more likely to choose richer m edia (faceto-face and telephone) than leaner m edia (memo, email, letter, and voice mail).
Furtherm ore, participants who chose leaner m edia perceived a higher probability o f being
caught in their deception.
To identify receivers’ m edia preferences for deceptive com m unications, a second
group o f participants was asked to identify how confident they were that they could
detect deception in various media. Interestingly, receivers report higher levels o f
confidence in richer m edia contexts. It should be noted that confidence in detection
ability is not analogous to detection ability. In fact, M cCornack and Parks (1986) provide
evidence that confidence leads to decreased detection ability. The results o f Carlson and
George (2004) demonstrate that senders and receivers perceive that deception and its
detection is affected by the com m unication environment, but do not provide any
inform ation on the actual effect o f com m unication environment.
Truth-Bias
A s previously outlined, M cCornack and Parks (1986) propose that as familiarity
betw een individuals grows, they gain confidence in their ability to detect deception,
w hich leads to an increase in truth-bias and a decrease in detection accuracy. Boyle et al.
(2008) test this relationship in a com puter-mediated setting. Experim ent participants were
paired and asked to play a game o f “prisoner’s dilemma.” Prior to m aking the decision to
“stay quiet” or “confess,” participants w ere allowed to com m unicate with one another via
a rich (telephone or face-to-face) or lean (instant messaging) m edium to convey their
intentions.
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Results o f the analysis indicate that detection confidence is increased by
familiarity, physical proximity, and a richer com m unicative environm ent. Consistent with
prior literature (M cCornack and Parks 1986), detection confidence leads to truth-bias and
poor detection accuracy, even in a com puter-m ediated environment. In an auditing
context, the study suggests that the use o f com puter-m ediated environm ents may not
m itigate truth-bias.
B urgoon et al. (2003) exam ine how com puter-m ediated com m unication affects
individuals’ perceptions o f trust as well as their vulnerability to m anipulation and deceit.
Using an experim ent, the authors used pairs o f participants who com m unicated in one o f
four ways: face-to-face, text only, audio only, and audio-visually. For each pair, the
authors random ly assigned one o f the partners to either tell the truth or engage in
deception. Participants were asked to discuss various topics for approxim ately ten
minutes, after which they recorded responses to a series o f debriefing questions.
R eceivers’ estimates o f their partners’ truthfulness were slightly low er for
deceivers than truth-tellers. However, for those pairs o f participants that included a
deceiver, results dem onstrate that receivers exhibit a truth-bias in both face-to-face and
com puter-m ediated communications. O f special interest to this section o f the current
review is how deceivers fare when using text-based com munication, as that condition
serves as a close proxy for auditors conducting client inquiries via email. The results
indicate that perceptions o f trust are low est for participants who com municated via text,
relative to all other media. However, deceivers who use text to com m unicate have higher
ratings o f believability than truth-tellers who use the same medium. Thus, the authors
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suggest that text-based com munication is “perhaps th e m ost ripe for m anipulation and
m isuse” (Burgoon et al. 2003, 10).
Suspicion
G eorge et al. (2008b) examine the effects of suspicion on deception detection in
com puter-m ediated communication. In their experiment, participants were asked to take
part in a m ock job interview. Interviewees provided a resume w hich included both true
and false inform ation about their qualifications. Interviewers were instructed to
thoroughly peruse the resume, after which they were allowed to ask questions to the
interviewees about their qualifications. Participants com m unicated via one o f three
media: email, chat, and audio. In addition, h a lf o f the participants received a warning that
“up to 40% o f all applicants have been know n to lie on their resumes and applications”
(George et al. 2008b, 8), which was m eant to increase interviewer suspicion.
Consistent with previous research on deception, interviewers exhibited a truthbias in all three media, as evidenced by the low rate o f successful lie detection. The
authors find that truth-bias is m itigated by the reception o f a warning, which m ay suggest
that skepticism improves deception detection. W hile m edium did not directly affect
deception detection, the authors report evidence of an indirect effect o f m edium on
deception detection through increased probing, w hich is operationalized as “the number
o f extra questions asked by interviewers about items that later proved to be deceptive”
(George et al. 2008b, 9). Specifically, w hen communication took place in richer media,
interview ers were more likely to probe, w hich led to greater deception detection.
W arning interviewers o f the possibility o f deception did not lead to increased probing.
The results o f this study provide further evidence that auditors should avoid computer-

mediated com munications when conducting client inquiries. Perhaps the use o f email
may cause auditors to be more hesitant to ask probing questions, which w ill lim it their
ability to detect client deception.
Suggestions fo r Future Research
The few studies examining deception in com puter-mediated com m unication
indicate that individuals might have difficulty practicing professional skepticism in a
com puter-m ediated environment, relative to a face-to-face environment. However, the
com m unication techniques employed by deceivers are dependent on context, and the
auditing context is different in many ways from the contexts used in previous research.
For instance, auditing is a “high stakes” environm ent, where the failure to detect
deception can be extremely costly to the audit firms and financial statements users. In
addition, the conflicting incentives o f auditors and client personnel, as well as the
differing levels o f pow er and inform ation in the relationship m ay also affect deception
and its detection. Accordingly, future research should exam ine those contextual variables
that are unique to the audit environment.
First, future research should exam ine the determinants o f auditors5 choice o f
com m unication medium when conducting client inquiries. For instance, how do client
preferences affect auditors’ use o f com puter-m ediated communication for client
inquiries? D ue to changes in business com munications, client-com m unication norm s may
lim it the opportunity o f face-to-face interaction between auditors and clients. In addition,
how do the tim e constraints inherent in the audit process affect auditors’ propensity to use
com puter-m ediated communication for client inquiries? Is the use o f computer-mediated
com m unication determined by individual engagement partners and m anagers, or are there

35

firm-wide policies in place that govern auditors’ use o f computer-mediated
com m unication during an audit?
Second, research should examine auditors’ ability to detect deception using
various com m unications media. Are auditors able to exhibit professional skepticism via
em ail? H ow does communication medium affect auditors’ susceptibility to truth-bias?
Future research could exam ine how to encourage auditor skepticism in order to overcome
the lack o f behavioral cues available in leaner com m unication environments. The results
o f George et al. (2008b) suggest that research should also exam ine how to m otivate
auditors to ask additional questions to verify client responses received via com puter
m ediated com munication.
Finally, future research can exam ine w hether there are circumstances in which
com puter-m ediated com munication improves deception detection. For instance, Bennett
and Hatfield (2013) report that because o f the social mism atch between staff-level
auditors and experienced client management, auditors reduce the am ount o f evidence
they collect in order to avoid client interactions. However, com municating via computermediated m edia appears to reduce the effect o f social mismatch. Thus, the use o f
com puter-m ediated com munication m ay actually increase the likelihood o f auditors to
detect deception in certain situations. The next section exam ines a m ethod o f deception
detection that is unique to com puter-m ediated environm ents; namely the use o f textanalysis to identify deception.

Autom ated Deception Detection in Text-Based Communications
As discussed previously, leaner m edia are less conducive to the sending and
receiving o f inform ation cues (Daft and Lengel, 1986). Individuals are typically unable to
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detect deception in rich environments (Kraut 1980), and lean environm ents may
exacerbate the problem (Burgoon 2003; George et al. 2008b). Perhaps the lim ited number
o f cues perceptible to hum an senses in com puter-m ediated contexts precludes auditors
from detecting deception (Lee et al. 2009), which should cause great concern to audit
firms w itnessing an increase in computer-mediated auditor-client com munications
(W estermann et al. 2013). One potential solution is th e automation o f detection in textbased com m unication using characteristics o f the text itself. In order to autom ate
deception detection, text-based cues to deception m ust first be identified.
An experim ent conducted by Zhou et al. (2004a) provides support that linguisticsbased cues can be instrumental in detecting deception by identifying differences between
deceivers and truth-tellers. In the experiment, dyads w ere instructed to rank a num ber o f
items in term s o f how critical they were to surviving in a desert. In approxim ately h alf of
the dyads, one m em ber was asked to deceive by ranking the items in an order contrary to
their own beliefs. Discussions occurred via text-based, asynchronous com munication,
which was later coded for analysis. Results indicate that deceivers com municate
differently than truth tellers. For example, deceivers display a higher quantity o f
com m unication, as well as more expressive and less formal language.
H ancock et al. (2008) conduct a sim ilar study exam ining deception in
synchronous text-based communication. In their experiment, dyads w ere asked to discuss
four topics, and each dyad contained a participant w ho was deceptive during the
discussion o f tw o o f the four topics. The authors analyzed transcripts o f the discussions to
determine differences in communication between deceivers and truth-tellers. Similar to
Zhou et al. (2004a), they report that deceivers produce more words, relative to truth-
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tellers. They also report that deceivers use m ore sense-based words, and tend to prefer
other-oriented pronouns to self-oriented pronouns.
Zhou et al. (2004b) extend research in this area by exam ining whether several
methods o f cue classification can accurately predict deception. Specifically, the authors
used discrim inant analysis, logistic regression, decision trees, and neural networks to
predict deceptive communication. The results suggest that the deception in text-based
com munications can be predicted at rates significantly higher than chance, and that the
results are im proved after limiting the analysis to the m ost indicative deceptive cues.
Neural networks appear to perform slightly better than other classification m ethods, and
are the most reliable m ethod o f classification across the authors’ test settings.
Lee et al. (2009) study the difference in asynchronous text-based com munication
between deceivers and truth-tellers in a context m ore similar to a client inquiry setting.
Experimental m aterials (which were adapted from Lee and W elker 2007), indicated that a
property m anager w anted to falsify the value o f real estate listed in his com pany’s
records. Surveys explaining the scenario were distributed to participants, and participants
were asked w hat the m anager should avoid including in an em ail to his supervisor to
protect his lie from discovery. The results yielded several potential cues to deception. A
second sample o f participants received the sam e inform ation and was asked about cues
that the m anager could include in his report to appear more truthful. The results yielded
several potential cues that belied truth-telling. Dyads then took part in an experim ent in
which one partner (the auditor) tried to verify the value o f real estate by talking w ith the
other partner (the property manager). H alf o f the property managers told the truth while
the other h a lf attem pted to deceive auditors. The authors analyzed text from em ailed

discussions to exam ine the differences between truthful and deceptive communications.
Results reveal that relative to truth-telling managers, deceptive managers avoid those
cues identified by survey results as indicating deception, but use a greater num ber o f
truth-conveying cues. Lee et al. (2009) find some results that contradict previous research
(Zhou et al. 2004a), w hich suggests that deception techniques in com puter-mediated
com m unication are dependent on context.
Suggestions fo r Future Research
Additional research is needed to determine w hether automated text-based
deception detection is a viable option for audit firms. Future studies could construct a
database using em ail correspondence related to several actual frauds to determ ine the
com m unication techniques employed by deceptive client personnel. The results might
provide cues to deception that are unobservable in studies examining individuals’
perceptions o f w hat constitutes honest and deceptive com munication (e.g., Lee et al.
2009). Future research could also determine w hether deception can be detected after
controlling for individual characteristics o f the com m unicator and other contextual
factors. Finally, researchers could examine w hether autom ated text-based deception
detection is effective in a multi-period setting. H ow quickly can deceptive m anagers learn
to adjust their com m unication in order to fool autom ated deception detection? In
addition, w ould a m easure o f automated deception detection cause auditors to ignore
other indicators o f deception?
VI.

C O N C L U S IO N

The purpose o f this paper is to review relevant literature on deception and its
detection as it relates to a client inquiry context. Client inquiries are an essential part o f

the audit process. N evertheless, there are very few studies that have exam ined the process
o f interactive com m unication between auditors and clients. Research suggests that both
face-to-face and com puter-m ediated com munication provide deceptive clients w ith the
opportunity, and m ay even increase their ability, to deceive auditors. It is thus imperative
that audit firms understand the strategies that may b e employed by deceptive clients.
A uditors and accounting students appear to b e unable to accurately detect
deception in a client inquiry setting (Lee and W elker 2008). Furthermore, there is
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evidence that training and experience improves auditors’ ability to detect deception (Lee
and W elker 2008; 2010; 2011). Future research should examine whether forensic and
other specialized auditors have an increased ability to detect deception. Alternatively,
future research should exam ine how auditors can induce deceptive clients to exhibit an
increase in the num ber and strength o f deceptive cues in order to increase detection.
M cCornack and Parks (1986) demonstrate that an increase in familiarity leads to
decreased deception detection accuracy. This finding has important implications for
auditors who w ork w ith client m anagement on a daily basis. Future research should study
the effects o f auditor tenure and audit-client interaction on truth-bias. Future research is
also needed to determ ine how auditors’ professional skepticism tempers the effects o f
truth-bias, and w hat can be done to encourage auditors to rem ain skeptical during client
interactions.
In addition, accounting researchers and audit firms should seek to understand the
implications conducting client inquiries via com puter-m ediated com munication on
auditors’ ability to detect detection. The lack o f behavioral cues inherent in computermediated com m unication m ay place auditors at a disadvantage when trying to detect

deception. Future research in this area should focus o n how to overcome the drawbacks
o f a leaner com m unication environm ent and w hether audit firms should encourage or
discourage the use o f com puter-mediated com m unication to conduct client inquiries,
particularly for high-risk areas o f the audit.
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CHAPTER TH R EE
T H E E F F E C T O F M U L T I P L E A U D IT O R S O N D E C E P T I O N D E T E C T I O N IN A
C L I E N T I N Q U IR Y S E T T I N G

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N

Auditors gather im portant audit evidence through client inquiries (Ariail et al.
2010; Hirst and Koonce 1996; Trom peter and W right 2010). For instance, auditors use
inquiries to assess the effectiveness o f internal controls, clarify client accounting policies,
and investigate potential discrepancies discovered in financial statements during
fieldwork (e.g., when analytical procedures yield unexpected results). In addition, the use
o f client inquiries is essential to gathering the inform ation necessary to identify and
assess the risk o f fraud in a financial statement audit (SAS No. 99, AICPA 2002) and to
complete reviews o f interim financial statements (PCAO B 2012b, AU 722). It should
therefore come as no surprise that auditors use client inquiries on a regular basis. Bennett
and Hatfield (2013, 32) survey a group o f staff-level auditors and report that “86 percent
o f the respondents m et w ith management at least three to five days per week during a
typical week o f fieldwork, and 37 percent claimed to have m et with client management
every day.”
W hen fraud or other unethical behaviors are occurring, client m anagem ent might
purposefully m islead the auditors during the course o f an inquiry to conceal questionable
activities. Though such cases o f deceptive concealm ent are relatively rare, failure to
detect m anagem ent’s deception could lead to a failed audit, w hich can have dire
consequences for the audit firm, as well as for investors, em ployees, and pensioners of
the client company (R ezaee 2005). SAS No. 99 advises public accountants to attend to
the behavioral cues o f client personnel during inquiries w hich might signal the use o f
deception to conceal fraud (AICPA 2002). Behavioral cues indicative o f deception
include deceivers’ verbal responses (i.e., “inconsistent, vague, or implausible responses

from management or em ployees,” see AICPA 2002, para. 68) or nonverbal behavior
(CICA 2000, 4). Thus, profession guidance suggests that client inquiries provide an
important opportunity for auditors to detect fraud and other deviant acts.
Anecdotal evidence indicates m ost client inquiries involve a single m em ber o f the
audit engagement team. Though untested, extant literature on deception conjectures that
the sender o f a deceptive com m unication might be less convincing and exhibit more
“leakage” o f deceptive verbal and non-verbal cues in the presence o f multiple receivers,
and that multiple receivers m ight be better able to detect discrepancies in deceptive
messages due to a more diverse receiver knowledge base and increased skepticism
(M arett and George 2004; Slater 1958).3 The deception literature is readily applicable to a
client inquiry context in w hich a potentially deceptive sender (e.g., a controller) discusses
important audit issues w ith one or more receivers (auditors). The objective o f this paper
is to investigate whether the participation o f two auditors, relative to a single auditor,
increases the likelihood that deception will be detected in a client inquiry setting.
To examine this objective, I conduct a two by two experim ent in which
controllers (honest or deceptive) o f a fictitious com pany take part in a client inquiry with
auditors (single auditors or dual-auditor teams) to discuss a potential asset write-down,
after which auditors m ake a write-dow n recom mendation. I hypothesize that the presence
and participation o f an additional auditor improves deception detection by: 1) affecting
the amount o f controller discussion, and 2) increasing controllers’ nervousness.
Furthermore, I exam ine how controller discussion and nervousness m ediate the
relationship between controller deception and auditor w rite-dow n recommendations.
2 B ased on discussion w ith several auditors and personal experience.
3 L eakage refers to any nonstvategic behavior that betrays deceivers’ true intentions and beliefs (E km an and
Friesen 1969).
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The results o f m y analysis indicate that deceptive controllers lead more o f the
discussion (per auditors’ perceptions) when meeting w ith a single auditor, relative to
deceptive controllers m eeting w ith two auditors, and honest controllers. This m ay reflect
an attem pt to lim it the opportunity o f auditors to express skepticism or ask questions. I
also find that auditors’ perceptions o f nervousness are highest for deceptive clients
meeting with multiple auditors. Finally, I find that the incorporation o f perceived
controller discussion and nervousness into auditors’ subsequent write-down
recom mendations is contingent on the number o f auditors taking part in the client inquiry.
Specifically, increased discussion by deceptive controllers leads to higher write-down
recommendations for dual-auditor teams, but lower w rite-dow n recom mendations for
single auditors. In addition, dual-auditor teams, but not single auditors, increase write
dow n recommendations w hen deceptive controllers appear nervous. Thus, it appears that
single auditors do not adequately adjust write-down recom m endations when observing
behavioral cues indicating client deception. The results suggest that audit firms should
reexam ine the general practice o f using a single auditor to conduct client inquiries.
This study contributes to extant literature and audit practice in a num ber o f ways.
First, this study adds to the literature on client inquiries, w hich has received little
attention from prior research. Lee and W elker (2010; 2011) suggest that auditors may
have difficulty detecting deception in an inquiry setting. I com plem ent their work by
exam ining the factors that influence auditors’ success in detecting client deception.
Second, this study extends research on deception by extending interpersonal deception
theory (Buller and B urgoon 1996) to an auditing context. The differing levels o f power
and potentially conflicting incentives between auditors and clients make a client inquiry

setting unique. In addition, this is the first study to exam ine how the deceptive tactics
em ployed by deceivers may change w hen they are confronted by m ultiple receivers in a
face-to-face context, w hich answers the call o f M arett and George (2004). Third, much
has been written on the auditor-client negotiation process. The results o f this study may
shed light on how auditors form initial opinions on w hether and to w hat extent audit
adjustm ents are necessary, w hich is a critical input to the negotiation process (see Salterio
2012 for a review). Finally, from a practical standpoint, the results o f this research have
im portant implications for the m anner in w hich auditors conduct client inquiries; namely,
that audit firms should consider the use o f multiple auditors in client inquiries for highrisk clients or when audit firms have specific materiality concerns.
The remainder o f the paper is organized as follows. The second section
summarizes relevant background literature and presents my hypotheses. The third section
describes the research method. I present my results in the fourth section and discuss my
findings in the final section.
II. T H E O R Y A N D H Y P O T H E S IS D E V E L O P M E N T

Client Inquiries
Client inquiries are an essential source of inform ation throughout an audit. Ariail
et al. (2010) describe how the use o f client inquiries is helpful, and perhaps even
necessary, to comply w ith the three standards o f audit fieldwork (PCAOB 2010b, AU
150). For example, auditors can use client inquiries to learn about the risks faced by their
clients, as well as the internal controls implemented by their clients to address those risks.
In addition, client inquiries enable auditors to gain a better understanding o f the

accounting policies used by clients, including those that require the use o f complex
judgm ents and estimates.
Client inquiries are an integral component o f the process o f gathering audit
evidence and may help form the basis for the auditor’s opinion over the client’s financial
statements. The discovery o f a potential misstatement often leads the auditor to seek
additional evidence or clarification through client inquiries. For instance, previous
research shows that auditors prim arily rely on client inquiries to explain unexpected
results from analytical procedures conducted during an audit (H irst and Koonce 1996;
Trom peter and Wright 2010). On the one hand, client inquiries m ay placate auditors’
concerns. On the other hand, client inquiries may suggest that additional evidence is
required, or that an audit adjustm ent is necessary, in w hich case auditors may begin the
process o f auditor-client negotiations (Salterio 2012). Thus, client inquiries may be
viewed as an important precursor to auditor-client negotiations. After all, negotiation
requires that the opinions o f the auditor and client differ (Salterio 2012), and client
inquiries facilitate the form ation o f auditors’ initial opinions.
For this reason, clients that may be harmed by potential audit adjustments are
incented to use client inquiries as an opportunity to persuade auditors that no adjustments
are required. If clients are sufficiently convincing, they may be able to reduce the
proposed adjustment, or avoid an audit adjustments altogether. For example, based on the
interviews o f dozens o f auditors, H irst and Koonce (1996) and Trom peter and Wright
(2010) report that the inform ation provided by clients during inquiry, and the manner in
w hich it was provided, can reduce or negate the need for corroborating evidence from
additional audit tests. I exam ine prior studies on deception from the communications
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literature as the basis for hypotheses regarding the ability o f m anagem ent to persuade
auditors during client inquiries, and how persuasion m ay be contingent on the beliefs of
client m anagement (i.e., whether they believe they are being deceptive) and the number
o f auditors participating in the client inquiry.

Detecting Deception
Buller and Burgoon (1996, 205) define deception as “a m essage knowingly
transm itted by a sender to foster a false b elief or conclusion by the receiver.” Deception
is com m on in everyday discourse (D ePaulo et al. 1996; H ancock et al. 2004). However,
research indicates that people generally perform poorly at detecting deception in face-toface com munication (M iller and S tiff 1993). In fact, detection accuracy rates are little
better than chance (Kraut 1980; Levine et al. 1999). Research by Lee and W elker (2007;
2008) suggests that auditors and accounting students also have difficulty detecting
deception. This m ay well be the result o f “truth-bias,” or the receivers’ inherent
presum ption that senders are telling the truth (M cComack and Parks 1986).
In audit settings, where m anagem ent seeking to conceal fraudulent activity has
incentives to withhold truth or deceive auditors, this truth-bias could prevent auditors
from detecting deception and discovering financial m isstatem ents in the course o f client
interactions. Although auditors are expected to exhibit professional skepticism, there is
no reason to believe that auditors are im mune to the effects o f truth-bias, especially when
considering that the vast majority o f client interactions do n o t involve deception. Recent
reports by the PCAOB suggest that auditors are not exhibiting a sufficient level o f
professional skepticism (PCAOB 2008; 2012c), which may m ake auditors more
susceptible to truth-bias. In addition, prior research dem onstrates that increased

familiarity exacerbates truth-bias (M cC om ack and Parks 1986, S tiff et al. 1992), which
means that truth-bias may be a concern for auditors w ho spend m uch o f their time
interacting w ith clients.

Interpersonal Deception Theory
Buller and Burgoon (1996) propose interpersonal deception theory to model the
interaction between a deceptive sender and a receiver. Once a sender decides to deceive,
he/she is likely to employ the use o f strategic tactics aimed at m onitoring and managing
inform ation, behavior, and image in an effort to appear truthful (Buller and Burgoon
1996). At the same time, deceivers exhibit nonstrategic behavior (both verbal and non
verbal) as a result o f the physiological arousal that often is associated w ith deceiving
others. This aroused state com es about when receivers feel guilty about the deception,
fear being caught in their lie, or as a result o f personal characteristics such as natural
shyness and lack o f confidence (Ekm an and Friesen 1969, 1972; M iller and S tiff 1993;
Zuckerm an et al. 1981). Such arousal often results in leakage, w hich is the expression of
nonstrategic behaviors (usually nonverbal) that indicate a sender is engaging in deception
(Ekm an and Friesen 1969).
N onstrategic behaviors o f this nature manifest in m yriad ways. For instance,
extant research has examined how blinking, eye contact, speech hesitation, and fidgeting
can indicate deception (DePaulo et al. 2003; Zuckerman et al. 1981). However, there is
no single behavioral cue that clearly indicates deception, and receivers may have
difficulty perceiving the differences in cues exhibited by deceptive versus truth-telling
senders. In fact, a recent m eta-analysis reviewing 158 verbal and nonverbal cues to
deception finds that relatively few cues reliably signal deception (DePaulo et al. 2003).

Furtherm ore, deceptive cues are not present in every deception but surface only when the
deceiver reaches a sufficiently aroused behavioral state (Ekman 1985; Frank and Feeley
2003).
A fter receiving the initial com m unication, the receiver m ust interpret the message,
judge its veracity, and act accordingly. I f the receiver judges the initial message to be
dishonest, the receiver may choose to either confront the deceiver or hide his/her
suspicions from the sender (George et al. 2008a). Toris and DePaulo (1985) provide
some evidence that receivers perform poorly when strategically concealing their
suspicion, which greatly benefits the sender, because a successful deception depends on
the sender’s ability to m onitoring the receiver’s reaction to the initial message, i f the
sender perceives suspicion, he/she m ay adapt his/her m essage accordingly (Buller and
Burgoon 1996). For example, Buller et al. (1991a) find that deceivers m ay react to
receivers’ suspicion by adding details to their deceitful accounts or reducing their overall
levels o f participation. This dynam ic interaction between sender and receiver is an
iterative process and continues until the com munication concludes and the receiver
m akes his/her final interpretation and judgm ent o f the sender’s m essage (Buller and
Burgoon 1996).
Researchers have used interpersonal deception theory prim arily in the context of
face-to-face com munications involving a sender and a single receiver. Figure 1 illustrates
this dynam ic interaction in the context o f a client inquiry. If a controller (or another
m em ber o f client personnel) is incented to deceive auditors in order to conceal fraudulent
activity, he/she is likely to adopt strategic behavior (e.g., persuasive argum ents and
narratives) to convince auditors that audit concerns are unfounded. At the same time, the

controller m ay exhibit non-strategic behavior, or leakage, that indicates the controller’s
true beliefs. Auditors interpret the com m unication to form an initial opinion o f the
veracity o f the controller’s statements, and m ay display verbal or nonverbal signs o f trust
or skepticism. The controller adapts his/her message accordingly. Follow ing the client
inquiry, the auditors make a final judgm ent o f the controller’s m essage and m ake changes
to the audit if deem ed necessary.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
G iven the consequences o f an auditor’s failure to detect deception during an audit,
it is o f utm ost importance for audit firms to improve the ability o f auditors to detect
deception in their interactions with client management. Based on discussions with
auditors, the majority o f these interactions involve a single auditor. I posit that the use of
a single auditor m ay limit the ability o f auditors to detect client deception. The addition
o f a second auditor should increase the detection o f deception by: 1) affecting the amount
o f controller discussion, and 2) increasing controllers’ nervousness.

Controller Discussion
A ccording to Buller and Burgoon (1996), deceivers are likely to exhibit strategic
behavior w hen communicating w ith receivers in order to appear trustw orthy. One such
tactic identified in group decision m aking contexts is the sender’s attem pt to control
discussion during the course o f an interaction (Zhou et al. 2004a; Zhou and Zhang 2006).
W hen senders perceive that their com m ents raise receiver suspicion, they may add a
convincing narrative or argument in order to prevent questions and appease suspicions
(Zhou et al. 2004b). This study exam ines whether deceptive controllers attem pt to control
discussion during a client inquiry, and w hether the use o f this tactic depends on whether a
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single or m ultiple auditors are present in the interaction. For deceptive controllers,
increasing participation during the inquiry m ay limit the questions posed by auditors
about potential asset over-valuations. However, increasing participation during client
inquiries can be risky for deceptive controllers. Controllers m ust take caution to ensure
they do not contradict earlier statements or the auditor’s knowledge base (i.e., what the
receiver know s or believes to be true), w hich will decrease the likelihood o f a successful
deception (M arett and George 2004).
Previous research suggests that controllers’ decision to increase participation
during a client inquiry may be contingent on auditors’ desire to m aintain a cohesive
relationship w ith the controller (Zhou and Zhang 2006). Slater (1958) notes that in
smaller groups, and especially in groups o f two, individuals m ay feel unable to express
opinions that m ay be controversial or cause tension w ithin the group. Because o f the
intimate relationship that exists in small groups, individuals’ fear “ .. .o f alienating one
another seem s to prevent them from expressing their ideas freely” (Slater 1958, 138).
Thus, in a client inquiry setting, a single auditor may be hesitant to express skepticism or
criticism o f a controller’s statements. In such a setting, a deceptive controller can take
advantage o f a single auditor’s increased concern for group cohesion by arguing against
the position o f the auditor w ithout fear o f being suspected, w hich should lead to an
increase in controller discussion.
W hen multiple auditors are involved in a client inquiry, the desire o f auditors to
m aintain a cohesive relationship with the controller should be attenuated, because the
auditors are able to w ork together to determ ine the veracity o f the controller’s message.
In this case, the interaction between controller and auditors m ay becom e more
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adversarial, w hich m ay result in the auditors “ganging up”

011

the controller. In addition,

two auditors should have a more diverse knowledge base, relative to a single auditor
(M arett and George 2004). Thus, a deceptive controller must be more cautious not to
contradict earlier statements, as such discrepancies are a reliable indicator o f deception
(DePaulo et al. 2003), or auditors’ beliefs. W hen faced with two auditors, relative to a
single auditor, a deceptive controller will not have the same strategic opportunity to
control discussion, and as a result should participate less in client inquiries.
W hether this result will obtain in a face-to-face context has yet to be tested. In a
com puter-m ediated communication context involving group-decision m aking, Zhou and
Zhang (2006) find that deceivers in a triadic group dem onstrate a greater degree of
initiation than truth-tellers, as measured by the num ber o f questions asked to group
members, w hile no such result is found in dyads.4 These seemingly contrary results may
be a function o f the study’s context, as well as the electronic medium used to transm it
messages, as Lee et al. (2009) suggest that some cues to deception may be more
pronounced in a com puter-mediated environm ent due to the decreased opportunity to
build credibility w ith receivers. After all, there are few er cues available to receivers in
com puter-m ediated environments (George et al. 2008a). Thus, I predict that in the faceto-face inquiry setting examined in this study, deceptive controllers will be more likely to
attem pt to strategically control the conversation when a single auditor is present, relative
to two auditors.
In contrast, the degree o f participation exhibited by honest controllers during the
client inquiry should not be contingent on the num ber o f auditors present. Because they
4 The specific context o f the Z hou and Zhang (2006) study w as that participants w ere asked to rank various
item s in their order o f im portance for survival - the dynam ics o f w hich differ substantially from an audit
context.
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feel they have nothing to hide, honest controllers should feel no desire to dom inate the
discussion. Accordingly, I propose the following hypothesis:
H I:

C ontroller participation will be higher during client inquiries involving
deceptive controllers and a single auditor, relative to all other conditions.

Controller Nervousness
Lying can create physiological arousal due to feelings o f guilt or fear o f being
caught and can result in leakage, or cues that betray the true intent and feelings o f
deceivers (Ekm an and Friesen 1969, 1972; Zuckerm an et al. 1981). Cues o f this nature
are generally nonverbal, and may include pupil dilation, speech hesitation, and fidgeting
(DePaulo et al. 2003). The am ount o f leakage depends on the arousal felt by the deceiver
and m ay vary w ith the personal characteristics o f deceivers (M iller and S tiff 1993). Thus,
leakage will not m anifest in every instance o f deception (M arett and George 2004). This
may explain w hy m any previous studies report no evidence o f behavioral differences
between truthful and deceptive com munications (Ekm an and O ’Sullivan 1991).
N evertheless, the physiological arousal associated w ith lying should increase the
likelihood o f m anifest leakage for deceptive senders.
A nother factor that should increase leakage is social facilitation (Zajonc 1965),
which suggests that arousal is increased by the mere presence o f other individuals. A
deceptive sender should therefore be m ore likely to experience a higher level o f arousal
when deceiving m ultiple receivers as opposed to a single receiver (Zhou and Zhang
2006). A ccording to social facilitation, increased arousal leads to im proved performance
in simple tasks, and im paired performance in com plex tasks. Assum ing that the
concealm ent o f leakage during interaction w ith receivers is a complex task (Buller and

Burgoon 1996), leakage should be higher in a setting involving multiple receivers than a
single receiver.
Prior literature suggests that adequate training improves accounting students’
ability to detect truth-telling (Lee and W elker 2011) and white lies (Lee and W elker
2010) during casual interviews. However, prior studies suggest that auditors and
accounting students are unable to detect deception in inquiry settings (Lee and W elker
2008; 2010; 2011). I posit that the lack o f evidence is a result o f insufficient
physiological arousal on the part o f interviewees. The act o f deceiving in prior studies
might not have been enough to induce the physiological arousal necessary for leakage to
manifest. The arousal associated w ith deception and facing multiple auditors is more
likely to cause controllers sufficient arousal to exhibit leakage. Therefore, in the client
inquiry task presented in this study, I expect deceptive controllers m eeting w ith two
auditors to experience greater physiological arousal than controllers in all other
conditions, w hich will result in an increase in the leakage manifested by controllers and
perceived by auditors. One o f the most salient nonverbal indicators o f deceptive
com m unication is an increase in perceived tension or nervousness (DePaulo et al. 2003);
thus, I use auditors’ perceptions o f nervousness as a proxy for controller leakage. I
therefore propose m y second hypothesis.
H2:

A uditors’ perceptions o f controller nervousness will be higher during
client inquiries involving deceptive controllers and tw o auditors, relative
to all other conditions.
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Auditor Detection o f Controller Deception
According to interpersonal deception theory, after receivers receive a message
they must interpret the message, judge its veracity, an d act accordingly. M arett and
George (2004) provide some initial thoughts as to w hy it m ay be more difficult to deceive
multiple individuals than a single individual. Their suppositions, while untested in a faceto-face environm ent, are readily applicable to the client inquiry setting exam ined in this
study. A ccording to interpersonal deception theory, a successful deception depends on a
sender’s ability to m onitor receiver reactions and adapt the deceptive message
accordingly (Buller and Burgoon 1996). M arett and George (2004) posit that m onitoring
multiple receiver reactions becomes increasingly difficult for senders over the course o f
an interaction. A failure to respond correctly to receivers’ reactions m ay lead to a less
convincing argum ent, or increased leakage; both o f w hich decrease the probability o f a
successful deception. M arett and George (2004) also propose that deceiving multiple
receivers, relative to a single receiver, is difficult due to a more diverse know ledge base.
Hypothesis 3 tests whether auditors adequately incorporate their judgm ent o f
client deception into their final write-down decision. In the current study, a higher
recommended asset write-dow n by the auditor reflects a lower level o f belief in the
controller’s persuasive attem pt to convince the auditor not to write dow n the asset.
Consistent w ith M arett and George (2004), I expect deceptive controllers may
find it difficult to m onitor and appropriately respond to the questions and concerns o f two
auditors. In addition, the presence o f multiple auditors should increase the probability that
at least one auditor can detect discrepancies contained in the controller’s m essage (M arett
and George 2004).Thus, in the client inquiry setting exam ined in this study, I predict that

deceptive controllers w ill be less successful convincing auditors o f their position when
faced by two auditors, relative to all other conditions, w hich leads to the following
hypothesis.
H 3:

A uditors’ write-down recom m endations will be higher following client
inquiries involving deceptive controllers and tw o auditors, relative to all
other conditions.

The following section describes the research m ethod o f the current study.
III. RESEA RCH M ETH O D

Procedure
This study involves a tw o by two experim ent in w hich controllers (w ithin
participant: honest or deceptive) and auditors (betw een participant: single auditors or dual
auditor teams) participate in client inquiries to discuss the appropriate valuation o f an
asset. Data were collected during the summer and fall o f 2012 in four separate sessions.
Prior to participating, all participants were told only that they w ould take part in a
research study exam ining interviewing techniques. D uring the experiment, participants
were asked to assum e the roles o f controllers or auditors. Each controller took part in two
15-minute client inquiries, in which they met with the auditor(s) to discuss a potential
over-valuation o f finished goods inventory or accounts receivable. In addition, one
inquiry involved a single auditor, while the other inquiry involved two auditors. Auditors
each took part in a single client inquiry. Experim ental materials were adapted from Gold
et al. (2009).
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Controller Instructions
Participants assigned to the role o f controller were asked to assume that they were
an employee o f M icroClone Inc, a manufacturer of IBM -com patible personal computers.
They were given case m aterials in which they read th at during the course o f the y ear’s
financial audit, the auditors had become concerned about a potential over-valuation o f
two o f M icroClone’s asset accounts (finished goods inventory and accounts receivable).
Case materials indicated that the controller was recently visited by M icroClone’s CFO
and asked to defend the valuation o f the assets during a client inquiry with the auditors
(i.e., no write-down w as required). For each account, the CFO provided a list o f ten
reasons that could be used to justify M icroClone’s asset valuation. According to the case
materials, the CFO states that as part o f the m anagem ent team, the controller was to
defend the com pany’s asset valuation regardless o f any personal opinion they might have
over the assets’ “appropriate” value.
Before reading the lists o f reasons provided by the CFO, the experimenter
emphasized to the controllers that, even if they felt like one o f the sets o f reasons was
weak or questionable and the other was straightforward, they were still expected to
support the com pany’s position. The purpose o f this com m unication was to produce a
dem and effect, w hereby participants would believe that one set o f reasons was more
truthful than the other.5 The resulting variance in the extent to which controllers believed

sA nother m ethod for creating variance w ould have been to sim ply tell participants to either lie o r tell the
truth to the auditors. For ethical reasons, I did not ask participants to be deceptive. In addition, receiving
instructions from the experim enter to deceive may have reduced the physiological arousal associated with
deception. T herefore, controllers were allow ed to m ake their ow n judgm ents regarding deception.
A lternatively, 1 could have introduced variance by designing one list o f reasons to appear m ore deceptive
than the other. H ow ever, this m ethod m ay have resulted in a potential confound, as my results could be
attributed to controller condition (deceptive or honest controller) or the difference in the inform ational
content betw een the “deceptive” and “ honest” lists. To avoid th is confound, my lists w ere designed w ith
the intent that one w ould n o t be m ore believable than the other. D uring the 36 client inquiries held with

they were being deceptive or honest facilitated the testing o f the current study’s
hypotheses. The experim enter also explained that com pensation was dependent on
auditors’ write-down recom m endations, so that successfully defending the com pany’s
asset valuations w ould result in up to $20 o f additional com pensation (ten dollars for each
inquiry). The controller paym ent schedule, which w as presented to controllers prior to the
client inquiry, is geom etrically declining to further encourage controllers to persuade
auditors during client inquiries that no asset w rite-dow n w as required (see Figure 2).
After reading the lists o f reasons provided by the C FO , participants answered a set o f
questions used to m easure the extent to which they believed the information they
provided auditors during their inquiries. Controllers w ere allowed approxim ately five
minutes to prepare for each client inquiry, and each client inquiry lasted for 15 minutes.
Controllers were not told how many auditors would take part in the client inquiry. The
order o f the accounts (finished goods inventory or accounts receivable) was randomized
across controllers, and the auditor condition (single auditor or dual-auditor team) order
was randomized across sessions. Following the second client inquiry, controllers were
asked to complete a series o f debriefing items and dem ographic questions.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Auditor Instructions
Participants assigned to the role o f auditor w ere asked to assume that they were an
audit senior for a client called M icroClone Inc. In addition, they were asked to conduct a
client inquiry with M icroC lone’s controller to discuss a potential over-valuation in one of
two randomly assigned asset accounts (finished goods inventory or accounts receivable).
deceptive controllers, auditors discussed finished goods inventory 17 tim es and accounts receivable 19
tim es. The proportion o f either account being discussed in the deceptive controller condition is not
significantly different than 50 percent.
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Case materials indicated that although the asset may b e over-valued, it was possible that
no write-down would be necessary should m anagem ent be able to justify the current
valuation. Auditors were then told that they would hav e 15 m inutes to meet w ith the
controller about the potential over-valuation. A uditors w ere asked to make three write
down recom mendations during the experiment. They provided a recom mendation both
immediately preceding and following the client inquiry. The third recom mendation was
made after reflecting on the inquiry (or discussing the inquiry w ith a fellow auditor for
those in the dual-auditor condition) for an additional tw o minutes. After issuing a final
write-down recom m endation, auditors were asked to com plete a series o f debriefing
items and demographic questions.

First Independent Variable - Controller Condition
The first independent variable (DECEPTIVE) m easures the extent to which
controllers believed the inform ation they conveyed to auditors. The measure is a
com posite o f responses to a series o f questions asked before the controller participated in
his/her inquiries. For each accoimt balance, controllers were asked: 1) how honest the
CFO was when describing his belief that no write-dow n was necessary; 2) how truthful
were the reasons given by the CFO to persuade the auditors that no write-down was
necessary; and 3) how accurately the information provided by the CFO describes the
account balance. These m easures were captured on Likert scales ranging from 1 (not at
all honest/truthful/accurate) to 9 (very honest/truthful/accurate). In addition, the
controllers were asked w hat they believed would be the appropriate am ount o f write
dow n for each account, w hich was then converted to a percent o f the maximum possible
write-down. The four-item scale has a Cronbach’s A lpha o f 0.788. In addition, a principal

com ponents analysis revealed that all four items loaded highly on a single factor
(Eigenvalue = 3.26. 81.5 percent o f variance explained). Resulting factor scores were
split at the median. For each client inquiry, controllers with a factor score below the
median are considered “deceptive” controllers (.D ECEPTIVE = I), while controllers with
a factor score above the m edian are considered “honest” controllers (.DECEPTIVE = 0).

Second Independent Variable - Auditor Condition
The second independent variable (DUAL A U D ITO R ) indicates whether two
auditors are present during the inquiry with the controller. A fter reading about the
potential over-valuation in M icroC lone’s asset account but before making an initial write
dow n recommendation, auditors in the dual-auditor condition read that another audit
senior would accompany them during the inquiry. They w ere told that the accompanying
auditor had received identical inform ation about M icroClone from the staff auditor on the
audit, and that both auditors w ill be allowed to ask questions during the inquiry.

Dependent Variables
Hypotheses predict that controller discussion, controller nervousness, and auditor
w rite-dow n amounts will vary across experimental conditions. Controller discussion
(.DISCUSSION) is m easured as the auditors’ assessm ent o f the extent to which the
conversation was led by the controller compared to the auditors (I-D iscussion was led
m ostly by auditors, 9-D iscussion was led mostly by controller).6 Controller nervousness
(.NERVOUS) is m easured on a 9-point Likert scales that assess auditors’ perceptions o f
the controller’s nervousness (1-Not at all Nervous, 9-V ery Nervous). A uditors’
perceptions o f controller’s nervousness are used as a proxy for leakage because many

6 V ariables m easuring the relative participation o f participants are reverse-coded to sim plify their
interpretation.

auditors do not receive training as to the specific behavioral cues that may indicate
deception (e.g. changes in pitch, pupil dilation). Furtherm ore, the meta-analysis
perform ed by DePaulo et al. (2003) indicates that nervousness is a reliable indicator of
deception. W rite-down recom m endations were m easured as the percent o f the maximum
potential write-down for a given asset. For example, during the client inquiries in which
the accounts receivables balance w as discussed, auditors were asked to recom m end a
w rite-dow n o f between $0 and $500,000 to reduce the asset’s valuation to the
“appropriate” amount. A w rite-dow n o f 80 percent w ould signify that the auditors
recom m ended a $400,000 reduction in the account balance. W rite-down
recom mendations were solicited on three occasions: (1) prior to the client inquiry
(.P R E J ¥ D %), (2) im mediately following the client inquiry (P O ST _W D % \ and (3) after
reflecting on the client inquiry (or discussing the client inquiry w ith a fellow auditor for
those in the dual-auditor condition) for an additional two m inutes (FINAL_W D %). The
results o f the experiment are presented in the following section.
IV . R E S U L T S

Participants
D uring the experim ent, 108 participants assumed the role o f auditors and 36
participants assumed the role o f controllers. Participants in the role o f auditors were
recruited from M aster’s-level accounting courses at a m idsized private university located
in the Northeast and received a small amount o f class credit for their participation. The
sam ple was limited to M aster’s-level accounting students because their coursework
enabled them to serve as an effective proxy for staff-level auditors. I believe M aster’s
level accounting students are a suitable proxy in a client inquiry setting for several

reasons. First, Bennett and Hatfield (2013) provide som e evidence that staff-level
auditors frequently meet with m embers o f client m anagem ent during fieldwork. Second,
previous research suggests that the participation o f staff-level auditors in client inquiries
(as they relate to analytical procedures) has increased in recent years. Based on data
collected nearly twenty years ago, Hirst and Koonce (1996) report that the bulk o f
analytic procedures (and associated client inquiries) were perform ed by seniors and
managers. In contrast, Trom peter and W right (2010, 687) find that analytical procedures
“are perform ed prim arily by the staff and seniors (48 percent and 35 percent
respectively).” Third, Lee and W elker (2008) find that the deception detection accuracy
rate o f experienced auditors is not significantly higher than that o f accounting students,
w hich lends further support to the use o f accounting students in this setting. Finally, a
review o f the deception literature suggests that the use o f students as participants in
deception studies is com m on practice; a meta-analysis by DePaulo et al. (2003, 88)
reports that 101 o f 120 reviewed studies involved student participants.
Participants in the role o f controllers responded to advertisem ents posted on a
school website requesting the participation o f graduate students pursuing a degree in a
business-related field, and consisted o f students and professionals. These participants
w ere given $30 for participating, and could earn up to $20 dollars more, depending on
their perform ance during the client inquiries. Table 4 includes the descriptive statistics
for participants in the roles o f auditors (Panel A) and controllers (Panel B), and Table 5
presents correlations for independent variables, dependent variables, and selected
covariates.
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here]

Preliminary Testing
M anipulation Checks
Among the debriefing items, auditors were asked w hether they had been
accom panied by another auditor during their inquiry. All o f the participants answered in
accordance with their treatm ent condition. Thus, the m anipulation was deemed effective.
P otential Covariates
To test for potential covariates, I used a M ANCOVA model where DECEPTIVE,
D UAL AU D ITO R, and an interaction term (D ECEPTIVE * DUAL _A UDITOR) were
included as independent variables. D ISCU SSIO N, N ERVO U S, PRE_W D% , POSTJ¥D%o,
and FINAL_W D% were included as dependent variables. Covariates included the
following: SESSION, IN Q U IR Y (i.e. w hether it was the controller’s first or second
inquiry), A C C O U N T (finished goods inventory or accounts receivable), controller gender
(C O N GENDER), controller student status (CON_STATUS), controller major
{CONJM AJOR), controller age {CO N AG E), controller experience (iC O N JIX P ), auditor
age (AU D _AG E), and auditor experience (AUD_EXP). Covariates w ith no significant
effect (p > 0.10) on any o f the dependent variables were dropped from the model. The
final M ANCOVA model includes IN Q U IR Y and ACCO U NT, and these covariates are
used in all subsequent ANCOVA testing. Pillai’s Trace for the M ANCOVA model shows
an F-value o f 1,87 (p = 0.113) for DECEPTIVE, an F-vaSue o f 2.34 (p - 0.052) for
D UAL jiU D IT O R , and an F-value o f 2.39 (p = 0.048) for D EC EPTIVE *
D UAL AUDITOR.

Tests o f Hypotheses
Controller Discussion
H I predicts that controllers will exhibit a greater level o f discussion during client
inquiries when controllers are deceptive and one auditor is present, relative to all other
conditions. D ata on controller participation were collected by soliciting the auditors’
perceptions o f the extent to which controllers lead discussion during the client inquiries.
Panel A o f Table 6 shows cell means for D ISCU SSIO N across the four experimental
treatm ents. H igher scores indicate that controllers led more o f the discussion, while lower
scores indicate that auditors led m ore o f the discussion. Panel B displays the results o f an
A N CO V A m odel where D ISC U SSIO N is the dependent variable. Only a single covariate,
A C C O U N T , has a significant (p = 0.049) effect on D ISCUSSIO N, the analysis o f which
indicates that controllers led m ore o f the discussion during the inventory inquiry (M =
5.29) than the accounts receivable inquiry (M = 4.17). Results indicate that the interaction
o f D EC EPTIVE * D U A L A U D IT O R is also significant (p = 0.016). Marginal means for
the experim ental conditions are show n in Figure 3.
In order to test H I, a H elm ert contrast (see Table 6, Panel C) was used to compare
deceptive controllers’ discussion during client inquiries involving a single auditor (M =
5.77) w ith the average level o f controller discussion across all other cells (M = 4.34),
after controlling for covariates. Results o f the Helmert contrast indicate that discussion is
higher for deceptive controllers m eeting with a single auditor (M = 4.05) than for
controllers in all other conditions [p = 0.006, two-tailed], thereby supporting H I.

7 H I predicts increased discussion by deceptive controllers m eeting w ith a single auditor. D ue to the
construction o f th e variable, D ISC U SS IO N m ay be higher for controllers m eeting w ith a single auditor
because there are few er people involved in the inquiry. However, because all auditors receive identical
inform ation p rio r to an inquiry, it is doubtful that the discussion led by auditors will double during inquiries

[Insert Table 6 and Figure 3 about here]
Controller Nervousness
H2 exam ines the level o f physiological leakage exhibited by controllers, as
m easured by auditors’ perceptions o f how nervous the controller appeared during the
client inquiry. Cell means for nervousness are presented in Panel A o f Table 7. IT2
predicts that auditors’ perceptions o f controller nervousness w ill be higher when
controllers are deceptive and two auditors are present during the client inquiry, relative to
all other conditions. To test H 2,1 use an ANCOVA model with N ER VO U S as the
dependent variable. None o f the covariates included in the model are significant (p >
0.10). Table 7, Panel B shows a m arginally significant interaction between SENDER and
RECEIVER (p = .067, two-tailed). M arginal means for the experimental conditions are
shown in Figure 4.
To further examine the hypothesis, a Helmert contrast is used to compare
controller nervousness (as perceived by auditors) for client inquiries involving a
deceptive controller and a dual-auditor team (M = 5.01) w ith the average assessed
nervousness for all other conditions (M = 3.26), after controlling for covariates. Results
o f the H elm ert contrast, shown in Panel C o f Table 7, support H2 [p = 0.002, two-tailed].
The results suggest that a second auditor is necessary before the physiological arousal is
sufficiently high for physiological leakage to become m anifest as controller nervousness.
[Insert Table 7 and Figure 4 about here]

including tw o auditors. Thus, there are essentially two parties (i.e., client and auditors) involved in an
inquiry even w hen m ultiple auditors are present. Furtherm ore, if the design o f D ISC U SSIO N results in
increased discussion for controllers m eeting w ith a single auditor, the analysis should show a significant
m ain effect for D U AL_AU D ITO R. H ow ever, the main effect is not significant.

Auditor Write-Down Recommendations
To assess how the experimental conditions would affect write-dow n
recom m endations, auditors were asked to provide write-down recom m endations three
times during the experiment. The first recom m endation was solicited prior to the client
inquiry. Panel A o f Table
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shows the cell means o f initial write-dow n recommendations

across experim ental treatments. I m ade no hypothesis regarding the initial write-down
recom m endation, as I intended it would serve only as a baseline for subsequent
recom mendations. Panel B presents the results o f an ANCOVA model where PRE_W D%
is the dependent variable. There are no significant covariates in the model. Interestingly,
receiver condition has a moderately significant effect on auditors’ initial write-down
recom m endation (p = 0.065, two-tailed). It appears that simply know ing that they would
be accom panied by an additional auditor caused participants in the dual-auditor team
condition to recom m end higher write-dow ns o f client assets, perhaps because they felt
m ore accountable for their decision. Prior literature has shown that predecisional
accountability o f this nature reduces a num ber o f biases and increases objectivity
(Tetiock 1983; 1985). W hile it is difficult to say whether auditors in the dual-auditor
condition are being more objective prior to taking part in the client inquiry, it does appear
that the expectation o f an accompanying auditor biases w rite-dow n decisions tow ard a
position o f increased conservatism. A n alternative explanation is that auditors in the dual
auditor team condition engage in a type o f preem ptive groupthink (Janis 1972). That is,
the desire o f dual-auditor teams to conform to one another’s viewpoint m ight make them
more likely to ignore the alterative perspective o f the controller (i.e., that no write-down
is necessary), w hich can result in a more conservative write-down recom mendation.

[Insert Table 8 about here]
A uditors were asked to issue their second w rite-dow n recom m endations
im m ediately following the client inquiries (PO ST_W D % ). Cell means are displayed in
Panel A o f Table 9, Due to the significant effect o f D UAL_AUD ITOR on initial write
down, I included PRE_W D% as a covariate in the ANCO V A m odels exam ining
subsequent write-dow n decisions as well as D ISC U SSIO N and NERVOUS. Hypothesis 3
predicts that write-dow n recommendations w ill be higher for deceptive controllers
m eeting w ith dual-auditor teams, relative to all other conditions. ANCO V A results are
shown in Panel B. The interaction o f D ECEPTIVE * DUAL A UDITOR is insignificant.
Furtherm ore, a Helm ert contrast does not support the predicted difference in
POST'_WD%o for the write-down recom m endation (p = 0.923); thus, hypothesis 3 is
rejected. A review o f ANCOVA results indicates that PRE_W D% significantly affects
PO ST_W D % , as expected. W rite-down recom m endations appear to be decreased by
increased D ISC U SSIO N (p = 0.058, two-tailed), and increased by higher perceptions o f
controller nervousness. The main effect o f D ECEPTIVE is also significant (p = 0.018).
Specifically, post-inquiry write-downs are significantly higher for deceptive controllers,
relative to honest controllers. This finding com plements prior literature (Lee and W elker
2010

; 2 0 1 1 ) by dem onstrating a context in w hich auditors are able to detect deception in

an inquiry setting.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
I solicited auditors’ third and final write-dow n recom m endation (FIN AL_W D %)
after they w ere given an additional two m inutes to think about the client inquiry (for
single auditors) or discuss the client inquiry w ith the accompanying auditor (for dual-

auditor teams). The reason for the third w rite-dow n recom m endation was to exam ine the
effect o f auditor discussion on write-down recom m endations for auditors in the dual
auditor team condition. Prior literature does not suggest a direction for the effect, so I
make no formal hypothesis. Consistent w ith proper experim ental design, single auditors
were also given the opportunity to provide a third w rite-dow n recom mendation, though
no difference was expected between PO ST_W D% and FINAL_W D% . A t-test indicates
that FINAL_W D % is 3.70% higher PO ST_W D % (p = 0.028, two-tailed). However, no
significant differences exist for any o f the exam ined experimental conditions (p >

0 . 1 0 ).

Additional analysis reveals that for the 36 dual-auditor teams, 19 pairs did not agree on a
write-down recom m endation immediately following the inquiry (i.e., auditors had
different values for POST_W D% ). FINA L_W D% did not equal the average o f auditors’
POST-W D% in any o f the 19 pairs. FINA L_W D% w as higher than average
POST_W D% for 15 pairs (79 percent) and low er than average POST_W D% for four
pairs

(2 1

percent), which suggests that discussion between auditors leads to more

conservative w rite-dow n recommendations (Z = 3.095; p = 0.002, two-tailed).
Panel A o f Table 10 displays cell means o f FINAL_W D% for the four
experimental treatm ents, and Panel B shows the result o f an ANCOVA analysis where
FINAL J V D % is the dependent variable. Results are consistent with the previous analysis
exam ining PO ST_W D% . PREJWD%, D ISC U SSIO N , m d NERVO U S are significant
covariates. H3 is not supported, as the interaction o f sender and receiver conditions is not
significant, and a H elm ert contrast indicates no difference between write-down
recom m endations following client inquiries w ith deceptive controllers and a dual-auditor
team, and other experim ental conditions (p = 0.757, two-tailed). The m ain effect o f

DECEPTIVE (p - 0.53, two-tailed) indicates that auditors are able to perceive when
controllers are engaging in deception.
Interestingly, IN Q U IR Y (e.g., whether it was the controller’s first or second
inquiry) approaches significance for both PO ST_W D % (p = 0.115, two-tailed) and
FINAL_WD%o (p = 0.115, two-tailed). A com parison o f means shows that in both cases,
auditors’ w rite-dow n recom mendations are lower for controllers’ second inquiries. This
suggests a learning effect on the part o f controllers such that their ability to persuade
appears to im prove over time. Due to the design o f this experiment (auditors participated
in a single client inquiry), the results have no im plications for or against auditors
m aintaining long relationships with clients. However, the increased persuasiveness o f
managers is particularly worrisome for managers w ho are concealing fraud or deception.
The following section exam ines the mediating effect o f controller discussion and
nervousness on write-dow n recommendations.
[Insert Table 10 about here]

Mediation Analysis
In order to better understand the process by w hich auditors make their write-down
recom mendations, I exam ine D ISCU SSIO N and N E R VO U S as mediators o f the
relationship betw een D ECEPTIVE and auditors’ write-down recommendations. For the
sake o f sim plicity, I focus my analysis on a single recom mendation, FINAL_W D% . In
addition, I exam ine how mediation may be contingent on DUAL_AUDITOR. To test for
mediation, I use the “causal steps” approach, popularized by Baron and Kenny (1986)
and applied extensively in the accounting literature. According to the causal steps
approach, D ISC U SSIO N and N ERVO U S are considered mediators o f FINAL_W D % if:
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(1) DECEPTIVE significantly predicts FINAL_W D % ; (2) DECEPTIVE significantly
predicts D ISC U SSIO N and NERVOUS; and (3) D ISC U SSIO N and NERVOUS
significantly predict FINAL_ WD%> after controlling fo r DECEPTIVE. Figure 5 presents
the tested relationships. Regression analysis was used to analyze the above relationships
for both values o f D UAL AUDITOR. Consistent w ith previous analyses, ACCO U NT,
INQ UIRY, and PRE_W D % were used as covariates in each regression. Results do not
support D ISC U SSIO N and N ERVO U S as a m ediator, as D ECEPTIVE is not a significant
predictor o f FIN AL_W D % at either value o f D UAL_AUD ITOR.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
However, the causal steps approach might not be appropriate for the current
analysis. The causal steps approach has been heavily criticized for several reasons (Hayes
2009). First, sim ulation studies exam ining methods for testing intervening variable
effects suggest that the causal steps approach is am ong the lowest in pow er (Fritz and
M acKinnon, 2007; M acK innon et al. 2002). In other words, if the effect o f DECEPTIVE
on FINAL_W D % is carried in part indirectly through intervening variables
(D ISCU SSIO N and/or NERVO US), the causal steps m ethod is the least likely o f m any
available m ethods to detect the indirect effect. From a conceptual standpoint, a major
criticism o f the causal steps approach is that it does not produce a measure o f the size o f
the indirect effect; rather, an indirect effect is inferred if an observed direct effect is
dim inished after controlling for the indirect effect. Furtherm ore, it is possible for a
significant indirect effect to exist even in the absence o f a direct effect (Hayes 2009;
M athieu and Taylor 2006), although an indirect effect o f this nature cannot be detected
through the use o f the causal steps approach. Finally, from a practical standpoint, the
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causal steps method is less effective for more com plex m odels involving m oderators or
multiple mediators than other techniques.
In light o f these concerns, I use PROCESS (H ayes 2012), a com putational tool
that is better suited to detect the indirect effects o f D IC U S S IO N and N ERVO U S on
FINAL_WD%. PRO CESS uses OLS regression to produce coefficient estimates, and
generates estimates o f direct and indirect effects o f m oderators and mediators. In
addition, PROCESS is able to control for the effect o f covariates. Figure

6

represents the

statistical model used to test the indirect effects o f D ISC U SSIO N and NERVOUS.
[Insert Figure

6

about here]

Table 11 presents the direct effect estimates o f the test variables D ECEPTIVE and
DUAL AU D ITO R S on the mediators (D ISC U SSIO N and NERVOUS) and outcome
(.FINAL_W D%) o f the proposed model. Panels A, B, and C are essentially a replication of
the tests used to exam ine hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 respectively; albeit PRE__WD% is
included as a covariate in each test. Results are consistent with the analyses presented
previously, except that PROCESS does not indicate a significant m ain effect of
DECEPTIVE on F IN A L_W D %.
[Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here]
Table 12 displays the conditional direct and indirect effects o f the model. Panel A
examines the direct (unmediated) effect o f D EC EPTIVE on FINAL_W D% for each value
o f D U A L A U D IT O R , and is represented on Figure

6

as c'i + c '4 * {DECEPTIVE *

DUAL_A UDITOR). There is no significant direct effect o f DECEPTIVE on
FINAL_W D% for receivers in the dual-auditor team. In contrast, single auditors meeting
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with deceptive controllers recom mended significantly higher asset write-downs than
single auditors meeting w ith honest controllers.
Panels B and C o f Table 12 present the indirect effects o f the model. PROCESS
relies

011

a bootstrapping technique to create standard errors o f effect sizes, as well as

upper- and low er-confidence intervals o f effect sizes. For the current analysis, 1000
bootstrap samples were used to create 90 percent bias-corrected bootstrap confidence
intervals. A confidence interval that does not contain zero indicates a significant effect.
Pane! B displays the indirect effect o f D EC EPTIVE on F 1N A LJ¥D % at each
value ofD U A L _A U D IT O R through each potential m ediating variable (D IC U SSIO N and
NERVOUS). In Figure 6 , the conditional indirect effects are represented by (aj + eu\ *
(SENDER * RECEIVER)) * b , . 8 Results shown on T able 11, as well as the ANCOVA
results reported previously (see Table 10), suggest that increased D ISC U SSIO N as w ell as
increased N ERVO U S are associated with higher w rite-dow n recommendations. However,
an analysis o f the conditional indirect effect o f D ISC U SSIO N and N ERVO U S on
FINAL_W D% is indeed contingent on whether one or two auditors are present during the
client inquiry.
As shown in Panel B, increased controller discussion marginally increases
FINAL_W D% for dual-auditor teams meeting with deceptive controllers, relative to dual
auditor teams m eeting w ith honest controllers (p < 0 .1 0 , two-tailed). Perhaps increased
discussion on the part o f deceptive controllers increases the likelihood that the controller
will say som ething that contradicts what the auditors believe or know to be true.
Alternatively, the presence o f two auditors may increase the likelihood that at least one
auditor will become aw are o f discrepancies in the controller’s arguments. Interestingly,
8 Indirect effect sizes (i.e., a 1? a2: a4, and b ,) are calculated separately for each m ediator.

73

controller discussion decreases FINAL_W D% for single auditors meeting with deceptive
controllers, relative to single auditors meeting with honest controllers (p < 0.05, twotailed). This result is som ew hat surprising, and may suggest a lack o f skepticism

011

the

part o f single auditors. It appears that deceptive controllers are able to sway single
auditors through increased participation during client inquiries.
Panel B also exam ines N ERVO U S as a potential mediator. Results indicate that an
increase in N ERVO U S is associated with higher w rite-dow n recom mendations for dual
auditor teams m eeting w ith deceptive controllers, relative to dual auditors meeting with
honest controllers (p < 0.05, two-tailed). However, n o such relationship exists in the
single auditor condition, as evidenced by the inclusion o f zero in the confidence interval.
The results suggest that not only are dual-auditor team s m ore likely to detect nervousness
during client inquiries w ith deceptive controllers, they are also more likely to incorporate
detected nervousness into their asset write-down recom m endations. The conditional
indirect effects o f both D ISC U SSIO N and N ER VO U S suggest that dual-auditor teams are
better able to incorporate the controller’s cues to deception into subsequent judgm ents, as
evidenced by an increased FINAL_W D% ,
Panel C exam ines the indirect effect o f D EC EPTIVE * D U A L A U D IT O R on
FINAL__WD%. The indirect effect is calculated as

04

* bj (see Figure 6 ). A significant

indirect effect is evidence o f “m ediated m oderation,” w hich means that the m oderation of
a variable is carried to an outcom e variable through a m ediator (Hayes 2012). The results
o f this analysis suggest that DUAL_A UDITOR moderates the effect o f D EC EPTIVE on
FINALJVD%o, and that the effect is mediated by both D ISCU SSIO N and N ERVO U S (p <
.05, two-tailed). In other words, the results o f the m ediation analysis indicates that the
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ability o f auditors to detect controller deception is dependent

011

whether they take part in

client inquiries alone or in pairs, and write-down recom m endations are a function o f
controller discussion and perceived controller nervousness.
A dditio n a l A nalysis
Alternative Categorizations o f Deceptive and Honest Controllers
In my prim ary analysis, D ECEPTIVE was determ ined by calculating a factor
score representing the degree to w hich controllers believed the inform ation they were
conveying to auditors, and resulting factors were split at the median. To more clearly
differentiate deceptive and honest controllers, I ran an additional analysis by creating
quintiles based on the same factor scores. I then rem oved the m iddle quintile, and
com pared the lowest two quintiles (deceptive controllers) w ith the highest two quintiles
(honest controllers). U sing a M ANCOVA model, I determ ined that the only significant
covariate (p < 0.10) is INQ UIRY, Pillai’s Trace for the resulting M ANCOVA shows an
F-value o f 1.83 (p = 0.124) for DECEPTIVE, an F-value o f 2.05 (p =* 0.088) for
D UAL_AUD ITOR, and an F-value o f 3.74 (p = 0.006) for DECEPTIVE *
DUAL_AUDITOR. The individual ANCOVA results are quantitatively and qualitatively
sim ilar to the previous analysis, and support the theoretical inferences made previously.
In addition, a case can be made for two additional categorizations o f deceptive
and honest controllers. First, a “truth score” (TRU TH SCO RE) can be calculated as the
average o f the three questions used to assess controllers’ beliefs about the honesty and
accuracy o f the CFO and the inform ation he provided in the case materials to be used by
controllers during the client inquiries. This measure does not account for the controller’s
personal opinion about the appropriate asset write-dow n, and instead focuses on the
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beliefs o f the controllers regarding the information they m ust convey to auditors. Second,
a categorization can be based solely on controllers 5 reported perceptions o f the
appropriate asset w rite-dow n am ounts (CON_WD%). As a check for robustness, I
categorize deceptive (TRU TH _SCO RE or C O N WD%> = 1) and honest (T R U T H JC O R E
or CON_WD%> = 0) controllers using these two m easures and replicate my ANCOVA
analysis described earlier. First, I use M ANCOVA m odels where the independent
variables are DECEPTIVE, DU'AL_AUDITOR, and D EC EPTIVE * D U A L jlU D IT O R .
D ISCU SSIO N, N ERVO U S, PRE_W D % , PO ST_W D % , and FINAL_W D% are used as
dependent variables. Similar to the main analysis o f this study, SESSION, IN Q U IR Y (i.e.
whether it was the controller’s first or second inquiry), A C C O U N T (finished goods
inventory or accounts receivable), controller gender {C O N GENDER), controller student
status (CON_STATUS), controller m ajor {C O N JAAJO R), controller age {CO N AGE),
controller experience {CO N EXP), auditor age (AUD_AGE), and auditor experience
(A UD_EXP) were included in an initial M ANCOVA m odel to test for potential
covariates. Significant covariates (p < 0 .1 0 ) were retained in subsequent ANCOVA
analyses exam ining D ISCUSSIO N, NERVOUS, and FINAL_W D % as dependent
variables.
[Insert Table 13 about here]
Results for the TRU TH JSC O RE categorization are shown in Table 13. INQUIRY,
ACCO U NT, and C O N EX P are significant covariates in the M ANCOVA models and are
thus included as in the A NCO V A models. Results indicate that controllers with greater
experience are perceived by auditors as being less nervous during client inquiries (p =
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0.026, two-tailed). Other results are quantitatively sim ilar to those using the study’s main
m easure o f deceptive and honest controllers (.DECEPTIVEf).
[Insert Table 14 about here]
Results for the second categorization, based on w hat the controllers felt w as the
appropriate amount o f asset w rite-dow n (CON_W D% ), are shown in Table 14. In contrast
to previous analyses, AC C O U N T is not a significant covariate in the M ANCOVA model
and is dropped from subsequent analysis. CON_AGE and experience CON_EXP are
included as covariates. C O N E X P is marginally significant in the ANCOVA model
exam ining NERVOUS (p = 0.098, two-tailed), signifying that experienced controllers
appear less nervous than inexperienced controllers. Although, C O N A G E and CON_EXP
are not significant covariates in any o f the other ANCO V A m odels (p > 0.10), their
inclusion causes N ERVO U S and SEND ER to become only m oderately significant
predictors o f FINAL_WD%. N evertheless, D ECEPTIVE appears to be robust to these
alternative measures.
The Ability o f Controllers to M onitor Auditor Skepticism
Interpersonal deception theory suggests that the ability o f senders to monitor
receivers’ reactions and adapt their message accordingly is essential for a successful
deception (Buller and Burgoon 1996). Furthermore, Toris and DePaulo (1985) provide
some evidence that suspicious receivers may find it difficult to conceal their suspicion. In
the client inquiry setting exam ined in the current study, the controller m ust m onitor the
skepticism o f auditors and address any concerns in order to persuade auditors that no
asset write-down is necessary. A series o f debriefing item s were asked to participants to
determ ine whether controllers could accurately assess auditor skepticism.
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Following client inquiries, controllers were asked to rate: 1) how honest they
appeared to the auditor(s) during the inquiry (CON_HONEST); and 2) the extent to
w hich they thought the auditor(s) believed their arguments (CO N_BELIEVE). I compare
controller responses with auditors’ assessm ent o f sim ilar items. A uditors were asked to
rate: 1) controller honesty (.AU D _H O NEST); 2) the validity o f controller arguments
(.AUD_VALID); and 3) the convincingness o f controller argum ents (.AU D jO O N V IN C E).
I f controllers are able to adequately m onitor auditor skepticism , sim ilar items (e.g.
C O N H O N E ST and A UDJHONEST) should be highly correlated. Correlations for these
item s are presented in Table 15.
[Insert Table 15 about here]
C O N H O N E ST and A U D JH O N EST are not significantly correlated which
suggests that controllers are unable to accurately interpret auditors’ perceptions o f
controller honesty. However, it does appear that controllers have som e ability to assess
w hether auditors believe their arguments. Table 15 shows a strong correlation between
C O N BELIEVE and A UD VALID (r = 0.417; p < 0.01, tw o-tailed), as well as
C O N BELIEVE m A A U D C O NVINCE (r = 0.383; p < 0.01, two-tailed). Interestingly,
for both controllers and auditors, perceived honesty and the strength o f controller
argum ents appear to be distinct constructs. W hile the measures are strongly correlated,
the variance shared by these variables is less than 50 percent in every case (e.g., r <
0.707). Thus, auditors m ay not believe a controller is being forthright even if the
controller presents strong arguments.
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Controller Assessm ents o f D iscussion a n d Nervousness
The current study relies on auditors’ perceptions o f controller discussion and
nervousness, primarily because the auditors’ perceptions are hypothesized to influence
subsequent write-down recom m endations. I compare auditors’ assessm ents with similar
items posed to controllers following the client inquiry. Specifically, controllers were
asked to assess the degree to which they led discussion (C O N D ISCU SSIO N ), and to
report on how nervous they felt during client inquiries (C O N NERVO US). Controllers’
responses are correlated w ith the auditors’ perceptions o f controllers’ discussion
(DISCUSSION) and nervousness (NERVOUS). Results are displayed on Table 16.
[Insert Table 16 about here]
Results indicate that there is little agreement between controllers and auditors
regarding controller discussion (r = 0.189; p = 0.111). The lack o f agreem ent may suggest
that controllers are unable to accurately gauge their level o f participation during client
inquiries. Controllers may be too preoccupied with the content o f their message to
actively control their level o f discussion. There does appear to be some agreement
betw een the am ount o f nervousness felt by controllers and perceived by auditors (r =
0.387; p - 0.001). The difference betw een C O N NERVO U S and N ER VO U S is likely
attributed to the controllers attem pting to hide their nervousness so as to increase their
persuasiveness. To examine how D EC EPTIVE affected controller’s ability to conceal
nervousness, I correlated CON_NER VOUS and NER VOUS for both deceptive and honest
controllers. Results suggest that deceptive controllers are better able to hide their feelings
o f nervousness (r = 0.355; p = 0.033, two-tailed) than were honest controllers (r = 0.416;
p=

0 .0 1 2

, two-tailed).
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To further contrast auditors’ perceptions o f controller discussion and nervousness
with controllers’ perceptions o f controller discussion and reported nervousness, I analyze
hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 using the controllers’ reported measures on Table 17. ANCOVA
m odels exhibit less explanatory pow er than those using auditor-assessed measures, and
H elm ert contrasts do not support this study’s hypotheses.
[Insert Table 17 about here]
V . D IS C U S S I O N

Client inquiries can provide essential inform ation for auditors (Ariail et al. 2010)
and are used on a regular basis (Bennett and Hatfield 2013). Yet there is a noticeable lack
o f research exam ining how auditors can m ore effectively conduct client inquiries.
Professional guidance suggests that auditors m ust be vigilant during inquiries for
behavioral indications o f deception (AICPA 2002; CICA 2004). In today’s audit
environm ent, the majority o f client inquiries involve a single m em ber o f the engagement
team , w hich may systematically lim it the ability o f auditors to detect client deception.
The purpose o f this study is to exam ine w hether the participation o f an additional auditor
increases the likelihood that managem ent deception will be detected in a client inquiry.
Results o f m y analysis indicate that the am ount of discussion used by deceptive
controllers depends on the num ber o f auditors participating in the inquiry. Specifically,
controller discussion is highest for deceptive controllers meeting w ith single auditors.
This m ay reflect the attem pt o f controllers to take advantage o f single auditors’ desire to
m aintain a cohesive relationship. I also find that auditors’ perceptions o f controller
nervousness are highest for client inquiries involving deceptive controllers and dual
auditor teams. This indicates that deceptive controllers faced by tw o auditors experience

greater physiological arousal, and consequently exhibit a greater level o f leakage.
Furthermore, my results indicate that accounting students are able to detect deception in a
client inquiry setting, which contradicts previous studies (Lee and W elker 2008; 2010;
2011), although I find that deception detection is not contingent on the num ber o f
auditors participating in the inquiry.
A dditional analysis exam ined the process by w hich single auditors and dual
auditor team s arrived at their write-dow n decisions, the results of which indicate there are
some advantages to using two auditors during client inquiries. Specifically, my analysis
reveals that as deceptive controllers increase participation in client inquiries, dual-auditor
teams issue higher write-down recom m endations, perhaps as a result o f detecting
discrepancies in the controller’s narrative. Single auditors on the other hand, appear to be
swayed by increased controller participation, as evidenced by low er write-down
recom m endations. This finding has im portant implications for audit firms, which may
need to encourage single auditors participating in client inquiries to m aintain professional
skepticism. Furtherm ore, my results indicate that dual-auditor teams, but not single
auditors, increase write-down recom m endations when they perceive higher levels of
controller nervousness. For client inquiries involving a single auditor, m y results suggest
that it m ay be necessary to encourage auditors to follow their instincts w henever they
sense an abnormally high level o f nervousness during client inquiries.
Adm ittedly, the use o f two auditors in every client inquiry m ay not be
econom ically feasible. As a consequence, audit firms m ay wish to take a risk-based
approach so as to assign two auditors to inquiries related to high-risk clients, or those
clients w hich w ould be most adversely affected by audit adjustments. In addition, audit

firms may assign two-auditors to inquiries related to specific accounts based on
materiality concerns. The benefits o f uncovering even a small num ber o f frauds or other
deviant acts m ay offset the cost o f an additional auditor.
This paper makes several contributions to existing literature and current practice. I
extend the w ork o f Lee and W elker (2008; 2010; 2011) by providing evidence o f the
ability o f auditors to detect deception. Few studies have examined client inquiries, which
is som ewhat surprising given their im portance in audit fieldwork. My analysis also
answers the call o f M arett and George (2004) to exam ine interpersonal deception theory
(Buller and Burgoon 1996) in a setting involving m ultiple receivers. M y study is the first
to exam ine the effect o f multiple receivers on deception detection in a face-to-face
setting. Client inquiries present a substantially different context than those exam ined in
previous group-decision studies, w hich m ay explain m y results are not consistent with
prior studies exam ining com munication in a com puter-mediated context (Zhou and
Zhang 2006). This study also contributes to the auditor-client negotiation literature
(Salterio 2012) by examining how auditors use client inquiries to form initial opinions
related to audit adjustments. Finally, from the perspective o f current audit practice, the
results o f this study hold implications for the m anner in which audit firms choose to
conduct inquiries.
This study is subject to several limitations. First, I use students taking M aster of
A ccountancy courses as surrogates for staff-level auditors. W hile there is some evidence
that client inquiries are frequently perform ed by staff-level auditors (B ennett and Hatfield
2013; Trom peter and W right 2010), it is unclear whether staff-level auditors w ould take
part in the type o f inquiries exam ined in this study, particularly in high-risk areas o f an

audit. N evertheless, results from Lee and W elker (2008) provide some evidence that my
results may apply to m ore experienced auditors. A nother limitation o f this study is that
participants were given limited information w ith w hich they could discuss the appropriate
write-down o f assets, thus the magnitude and strength o f results might differ in a richer
context. W hile the results o f this study are robust to changes in the classification o f
deceptive and honest controllers, the strength o f the results varies by classification.
Accordingly, results should be considered with some caution. Also, I study only two
potential indicators o f client deception. There may w ell be other behavioral cues that
influence auditor judgm ents, and these cues m ight also be contingent on the num ber o f
auditors participating in client inquiries. Finally, participants playing the role o f
controllers w ere given very limited inform ation upon which they could form their opinion
o f truth and lie, w hich m ay also influence my results.
Along w ith implications for the m anner in which audit firms conduct client
inquiries, this paper provides the basis for future academic studies exam ining client
deception. Client inquiries take part in various contextual settings, and contextual factors
m ay affect auditors’ deception detection ability. For instance, m y results suggest that two
auditors are necessary to induce sufficient leakage in deceptive controllers. In a highstakes setting, such as a fraud audit, does m anagem ent experience exhibit leakage
regardless o f the num ber of auditors taking part in an inquiry? In addition, there are times
during the course o f an audit when multiple senders interact w ith a single receiver. How
m ight the collusion o f senders affect deception strategies? Also o f interest, how does the
skepticism o f auditors affect their ability to detect deception, and can training in
skepticism or deceptive techniques improve deception detection? Furtherm ore, it is often

the case that auditors correspond with members o f client management w ith more
experience and know ledge (Bennett and Hatfield 2013). H ow might the social mismatch
between inexperienced auditors and upper m anagem ent affect auditors’ ability to detect
deception, and how will this ability be affected by th e use o f an additional auditor during
inquiries? W esterm ann et al. 2013 find some evidence that the younger auditors are
inclined to conduct client inquiries using com puter-m ediated communication. H ow might
the use o f such m edia affect deception detection, and how does the frequent use of
com puter-media com m unication affect auditors’ ability to detect deception in a face-toface environm ent? Finally, results from the current study indicate that while dual-auditor
teams are m ore likely to detect nervousness during inquiries o f deceptive clients than
single auditors, they do not issue higher write-dow n recom mendations. Future research
should delve deeper into the reasons for this seeming disconnect.
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Selected Studies on the General Findings o f Detecting Deception in Face-to-Face Contexts
Author(s)

Year

Aaniodt and
Custer

2006

To determ ine whether
there individual
differences in
deception- detection
abilities exist

M eta-analysis

• Results indicate no difference in accuracy rates based on
confidence, age, experience, education, and gender.
• “Professional lie-catchers” are no m ore accurate in detecting
deception than the average person.

Bond and
DePaulo

2006

To determ ine whether
there individual
differences in
deception- detection
abilities exist

M eta-analysis

• People are m ore accurate in judging audible than visible lies.
Truth-bias is prevalent.
• “Professional lie-catchers” are no m ore accurate in detecting
deception than the average person.

Buller,
Strzyzewski,
and Hunsaker

1991

To exam ine the effect o f Experim ent
an interactive, face-toface context on truthbias

• Participants who participate in an interview exhibit an increased
level truth-bias relative to an observer who does not take part in
an interview.

Burgoon,
Buller, Ebesu,
and Rockwell

1994

To determ ine the
susceptibility o f experts
to truth-bias

• Both experts and novices are subject to truth-bias.
• Truth-bias is higher w hen interviewees are acquaintances
relative to strangers.

Purpose

M ethodology

Experim ent

• M ajor Findings

Table 1 - (Continued)
Selected Studies on the General Findings o f D etecting D eception in Face-to-Face Contexts
DePaulo,
Lindsay,
M alone,
M uhlenbruck,
Charlton, and
Cooper

2003

To exam ine the
differences in behavior
between liars and truthtellers

M eta-analysis

• Liars are less forthcoming, and their arguments/tales are less
compelling.
• Liars make a m ore negative im pression and are perceived as
more tense.
• M any behavioral cues exhibited by liars are not different, or are
only slightly different, than those exhibited by truth-tellers.
• D eceptive cues are m ore pronounced when liars are motivated.

deTurck and
M iller

1990

To determ ine whether
training improves
deception detection

Experiment

• Training significantly increases deception detection for
unrehearsed deceivers and low self-monitors.
• The discrepancy betw een detectors’ actual ability to detect
deception and their certainty in the accuracy o f their judgm ents
is smaller for trained detectors than for untrained detectors.

Ekm an and
O'Sullivan

1991

To determ ine whether
certain occupational
groups had increased
ability to detect
deception

Experim ent

• M embers o f the U.S. Secret Service are shown to detect
deception w ith an accuracy rate significantly higher than chance
and other occupational groups.

Ekman,
O'Sullivan,
and Frank

1999

To determ ine whether
certain occupational
groups had increased
ability to detect
deception

Experim ent

• Professional groups w ith a special interest in deception; namely,
select law -enforcem ent officials and clinical psychologists, have
significantly higher detection accuracy rates than com parable
groups w ithout a special interest in deception.

Table 1 - (Continued)
Selected Studies on the General Findings o f D etecting Deception in Face-to-Face Contexts
Fiedler and
W alka

1993

To determ ine whether
training improves
deception detection

Experim ent

• D eception detection accuracy rates are im proved for individuals
who receive inform ation regarding cues to deception and
perform ance feedback.

Kraut

1980

To determ ine whether
individuals can
distinguish between
truth and lie

M eta-analysis

• The m ean accuracy rate for distinguishing between truth and lie
is about 57 percent, w hich is only slightly better than chance.

Levine, Park,
and
M cCom ack

1999

To exam ine the effect o f Experim ent
message veracity on
detection accuracy

• Accuracy rates are significantly higher than chance for true
statements and significantly low er than chance for false
statements.

M cCom ack
and Levine

1990

To exam ine the effect o f Experim ent
suspicion on detection
accuracy

• Suspicion has a non-linear relationship on accuracy, such that
individuals who are m oderately-suspicious have higher detection
accuracy rates than individuals w ith low suspicion and high
suspicion.
• There is evidence that state-suspicion and trait-suspicion are
distinct constructs.

M cCom ack
and Parks

1986

To examine the effects
o f familiarity on truthbias

• Increases in relational developm ent lead to increases in truthbias.

Stiff, Kim,
and Ramesh

1992

To exam ine the effect o f Experiment
suspicion on truth-bias
and detection accuracy

■o

Experim ent

• Suspicion reduces truth-bias, but has no effect on detection
accuracy rates.

T able 1 - (Continued)
Selected Studies on the General Findings o f D etecting Deception in Face-to-Face Contexts
Toris and
DePaulo

1985

To exam ine the effect o f Experim ent
suspicion on truth-bias
and detection accuracy

• Suspicion reduces truth-bias, but has no effect on detection
accuracy rates.

Table 2
Selected Studies on D etecting Deception in Client Inquiries
Author(s)

Year

Ariail, Blair,
and Smith

2010

To provide a synthesis
Review
o f the literature related
to detecting deception in
client inquiries, and to
provide
recom m endations for
auditors' use o f client
inquiries

Lee and
W elker

2007

To exam ine whether
accounting interviews
can detect deception,
and whether deception
detection is im proved
by training

Experim ent

• Accounting interviewers do not detect deception at rates greater
than chance.
• An inquiry setting appears to negate truth-bias.
• Training does not affect detection rates.

Lee and
W elker

2008

To exam ine how the use Experiment
o f behavioral cues to
make judgm ents o f
deception differs
between accounting
students and auditors

• Auditors and accounting students use sim ilar behavioral cues to
judge perception, w ith one exception - physical behavior that
indicated anxiety increased students' suspicion but did not affect
auditors' judgm ents.
• The deception detection rate o f auditors is not significantly
greater than fifty percent.

Purpose

M ethodology

• M ajor Findings
• Auditors should not focus on a single indicator o f deception.
• Auditors pay greater attention to verbal, rather than nonverbal,
cues to deception.
• Auditors should allow interviewees to speak as m uch as
possible.
• Auditors should com pare the inform ation gathered during
interviews w ith inform ation from other reliable sources.

Table 2 —(Continued)
Selected Studies on D etecting D eception in Client Inquiries
Lee and
W elker

2010

To determ ine whether
exposure to an
interview ee’s white lies
increases deception
detection accuracy

Experiment

• Exposure to interview ees’ w hite lies and truth-telling increases
white lie-detection accuracy rates, but has no effect on deception
detection in an interview setting.

Lee and
W elker

2011

To determ ine whether
calibration improves
deception detection
accuracy rates

Experiment

• Calibration (becom ing fam iliar w ith interviewees' truth-telling
behavioral cues) im proves interviewers' detection o f truth-telling
but has no effect on deception detection accuracy.

Table 3
Selected Studies on D etecting D eception in C om puter-M ediated Com m unication
Author(s)

Year

Boyle,
Kacmar, and
George

2008

To exam ine the impact
o f com puter-mediated
communication,
distributed
com munication, and
relational closeness on
detection accuracy

Experim ent

• Individuals' confidence in their ability to detect deception
increases w ith familiarity, proxim ity, and m edium richness.
• Truth-bias is a concern in com puter-m ediated environm ents, as
it negatively affects detection accuracy.

Burgoon,
Stoner,
Bonito, and
Dunbar

2003

To exam ine how
com munication
m odalities affect trust
and vulnerability to
deceit

Experim ent

• Truth-bias is prevalent in com puter-m ediated communication.
• Deceivers were perceived as most believable by receivers when
using text-based communication.

Carlson and
George

2004

To analyze senders' and
receivers' choice o f
m edia in com mitting
and detecting deception

Survey

• Senders prefer richer m edia for com m itting deception.
• Receivers prefer richer m edia for detecting deception,
particularly when com m unicating w ith individuals w ith whom
they are unfamiliar.

George,
M arett, and
Tilley

2008

To exam ine the effect o f Experim ent
warnings on deception
detection in com puterm ediated
com m unication

Purpose

M ethodology

• M ajor Findings

• People were easily deceived in both interactive and non
interactive media.
• W arnings o f potential deception increased deception detection.
• Richer m edia increased probing, which led to increased
deception detection.

Table 3 —(Continued)
Selected Studies on D etecting D eception in Com puter-M ediated Com m unication
Hancock,
Curry,
Goorha, and
W oodworth

2008

To identify differences
Experim ent
in text-based
synchronous
com m unication between
deceivers and truthtellers

• Com pared to truth-tellers, deceivers com m unicate more, use
m ore sense-based w ords, and use other-oriented pronouns rather
than self-oriented pronouns.

Lee, Welker,
and Odom

2009

To identify differences
Experim ent
in text-based
asynchronous
com m unication between
deceivers and truthtellers

• D eceivers use truth-conveying cues than truth-tellers.
• There is no difference in the num ber o f deceptive cues between
deceivers and truth-tellers.
• D eceivers prefer self-references to group-references.

Zhou,
Burgoon,
Nunamaker,
and Twitchell

2004

Experim ent
To identify differences
in text-based
asynchronous
com m unication between
deceivers and truthtellers

• Com pared to truth-tellers, deceivers com m unicate more, are
m ore expressive, appear less formal, make m ore typographical
errors, display less diversity, use nonim m ediate and uncertain
language, use m ore group references and m odifiers, and use less
com plex messages.

Zhou,
Twitchell,
Qin, Burgoon,
and
Nunamaker

2004

To test whether methods Experim ent
o f the classification o f
deceptive cues that
accurately predict
deception

• D eceptive cues classified by various methods (discrim inant
analysis, logistic regression, decision trees, and neural networks)
in text-based com munications can accurate predict deception at
rates significantly higher than fifty percent.

Table 4
Participant D em ographics
Panel A:
A uditors
N u m b er
Gender

Female

68

M ale

40

n

Student Status

Percent
63%
37%

108

Senior

N u m b er
19
17

P ercenta
53%
47%

36

0

0%

1

3%

104

96%

28

78%

Bachelor’s Completed

0

0%

4

11%

M aster’s Completed

4

4%

3

8%

Graduate Student

n

M ajor

Panel B:
Controllers

108

36

Accounting

85

79%

16

44%

Business M gt

12

11%

1

3%

Econ/Finance

4

4%

7

19%

Info. Systems

0

0%

2

6%

M arketing

0

0%

7

19%

Other

6

6%

3

8%

n

107

36

n

M ean

(SM

n

M ean ( S M

Age

106

25.95

(6.53)

36

24.97 (5.86)

Experience (years)

106

3.56

(5.71)

36

2.93 (5.05)

a Percentages m ay n o t add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 5
Correlations3^
1

\. D ECEPTIVE
2. D UAL AU D ITO R
3. IN Q U IR Y
4. A C C O U N T
5. D ISCU SSIO N
6, N ERVO U S
7. PRE WD%
S. P O ST WD%
9. FINAL WD%

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 .0 0 0
1 .0 0 0

0.278*
0.056
0.116
0.096
-0.197
0.146
0.108

0 .1 1 1

1 .0 0 0

0 .0 0 0

0 .0 0 0

1 .0 0 0

-0.151
0.287*

0.032
-0.039
-0.155
-0.204
-0.204

-0.285*
0.188
-0.169

0 .2 1 1

0.083
0 .1 0 1

0 .1 1 1

0.091

1 .0 0 0

-0.228
-0.088
-0.248*
-0.285*

1 .0 0 0

0.023
0.317**
0.348**

1 .0 0 0

0.348**
0.334**

1 .0 0 0

0.992**

1 .0 0 0

a * and ** indicate that the estim ated coefficients are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively (tw o-tailed).
b Pearson correlations.
V ariable D efinitions:
D E C E P TIV E - B inary variable indicating w hether controller believes inform ation he/she conveys to auditors (1 = deceptive controller, 0 = honest
controller);
D U AL_A U D ITO R - Binary variable indicating auditor condition (1 = dual-auditor team , 0 = single auditor);
IN Q U IR Y - B inary variable indicating inquiry num ber (1 = first inquiry, 2 second inquiry):
A C C O U N T - Binary variable indicating inquiry account (1 - finished goods inventory, 2 = accounts receivable);
D ISC U SSIO N - A uditor assessm ent o f the extent to w hich discussion w as led by controller (1 = led m ostly by auditor(s), 9 = led m ostly by controller);
N E R V O U S - A uditor assessm ent o f controller nervousness (1 = N o t a t all nervous, 9 = V ery nervous);
P R E -W D % - A uditor w rite-dow n recom m endation m ade prior to client inquiry;
PO ST-W D % - A uditor w rite-dow n recom m endation m ade im m ediately follow ing client inquiry;
F IN A L- WD% - A uditor w rite-dow n recom m endation m ade after an additional tw o m inutes o f reflection/discussion w ith accom panying auditor.

Table 6
Controller D iscussion
Panel A: Cell M eans (SD) [n] for DISCUSSION

DUAL A UDITOR
D E C E P T IV E * D U A L A U D IT O R

Y es

No

Overall

3.97
(0.99)
[17]

5.84
(2.29)
[19]

4.96
(2.01)
[36]

No

4.84
(1.68)
[19]

4.12
(2.23)
[17]

4.50
(1.97)
[36]

Overall

4.43
(1.45)
[36]

5.02
(2.40)
[36]

4.73
(1.99)
[72]

D E C E P T IV E
Yes

Panel B: A N C O V A Results for D IS C U S S IO N
Factor
INQUIRY
AC C O U N T
DECEPTIVE
DUAL AU D ITO R
D ECEPTIVE * D U AL AUDITOR

Hvnothesis

ss
0.636
13.771
2.889
6.261
21.051

df

1

MS
0.636
13.771
2.889
6.261
21.051

F
n-valuea
0.185 0 . 6 6 8
4.015 0.049
0.842 0.362
1.826 0.181
6.138 0.016

SS
54.613

df
5

MS
10.923

F
3.185

Hvnothesis
SS
—
31.550
HI

df
3

MS
10,517

F
n-value8
3.066 0.034
0.006

—

—
—

—
—

M odel Sum mary

A di. R-sq
0.133

1
1
1
1

n-value
0 .0 1 2

Panel C: H elm ert C ontrast Results
Contrast
Overall
(D E C E P T IV E -Y e s *
DUAL_A UDITOR - No)
versus all other conditions

a A ll p -v a lu e s a re tw o -ta ile d .
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Table 7
Controller N ervousness
Panel A: Cell M eans (SD) [n] for NERVOUS

DUAL AUDITOR
D E C E P T IV E * D U A L A U D IT O R

Yes

No

Overall

4.94
(1.64)
[17]

2.89
( 1 .8 8 )
[19]

3.86
(2.03)
[36]

No

3.61
(1.45)
[19]

3.35
(2.40)
[17]

3.49
(1.93)
[36]

Overall

4.24
( 1 .6 6 )
[36]

3.11
(2 . 1 2 )
[36]

3.67
(1.98)
[72]

D E C E P T IV E
Yes

Panel B: A NC O V A R esults for N E R V O U S
Factor
IN Q U IRY
ACCO U NT
D ECEPTIVE
DUAL AU D ITO R
DECEPTIVE * DUAL AU D ITO R

Hvnothesis
—

M odel Sum mary

A di. R-sa
0 .1 2 0

SS
4.648
4.563
5.196
26.066
11.893

df

1

MS
4.648
4.563
5.196
26.066
11.893

F
p-valuea
1.353 0.249
1.328 0.253
1.512 0.223
7.586 0.008
3.461
0.067

SS
50.314

df
5

MS
10.063

F
2.929

SS
40.140

df
3

MS
13.380

F
n-value8
3.894 0.013

1
1

n-value
0.019

Panel C: H elm ert C ontrast Results
Contrast
Overall
(D E C E P T IV E -Y e s *
DUAL A UDITOR - Yes)
versus all other conditions

Hvnothesis
H2

a All p -v a!u es are tw o -ta ile d .

102

0 .0 0 2

Panel A: Cell M eans (SD) [n] for PRE_WD%

D U ALA U D ITO R
DECEPTIVE * DUAL AUDITOR

No

Overall

66.76
(20.69)
[17]

57.63
(38.67)
[19]

61.94
(31.40)
[36]

No

80.79
(22.69)
[19]

65.88
(32.17)
[17]

73.75
(28.19)
[36]

Overall

74.37
(22.60)
[36]

61.53
(35.49)
[36]

67.85
(30.22)
[72]

DECEPTIVE
Yes

Yes

Panel B: ANCO VA Results f o r PRE_WD%
Factor
IN Q U IRY
AC C O U N T
DECEPTIVE
DUAL AU D ITO R
DECEPTIVE * D UAL A UDITOR

A ll p -v a lu e s are tw o -ta ile d .

Hvnothesis
—
—
—
—
—

SS
0.117
0.161
0.109
0.304

df
1
1
1

MS
0.117
0.161
0.109
0.304

0 .0 0 0

1

0 .0 0 0

1

F
o-value*
1.353 0.249
1.871 0.176
1.267 0.264
3.524 0.065
0 .0 0 1
0.974

Table 9
A uditor Post-Inquiry W rite-D ow n
Panel A: Cell M eans (SD) [n] f o r POST_WD%

DUAL AUDITOR
D E C E P T IV E * D U A L A U D IT O R

Yes

No

Overall

(36.64)
[17]

41.71
(32.02)
[19]

43.02
(33.81)
[36]

No

37.57
(35.61)
[19]

27.65
(36.53)
[17]

32.88
(35.88)
[36]

Overall

40.83
(35.75)
[36]

35.07
(34.47)
[36]

37.95
(34.99)
[72]

D E C E P T IV E
Yes

4 4 .4 9

Panel B: ANCO YA results fo rP O S T _ W D %
Factor
INQ U IRY
AC C O U N T
P RE WD%
D ISCU SSIO N
NERVOUS
DECEPTIVE
DUAL AUDITOR
D ECEPTIVE * DUAL AU D ITO R

Hypothesis

SS
0.227
0.050
1.017
0.333
0.510
0.498
0.036
0.199

df

A di. R - sq
0.270

SS
3.064

df

MS
0.383

F
4.289

p-value

8

Hypothesis

SS
0.768

df
3

MS
0.256

F

p-valuea
0.043
0.923

—

—
—

—

—
—
—

—

M odel Summary

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

MS
F
p-valuea
0.227 2.547 0.115
0.050 0.561
0.457
1.017 11.391
0 .0 0 1
0.333 3.734 0.058
0.510 5.713 0 . 0 2 0
0.498 5.581
0 .0 2 1
0.036 0.408 0.525
0.199 2.226 0.141

0 .0 0 0

Panel C: H elm ert C ontrast Results
Contrast
Overall
(D E C E P T IV E -Y e s *
DUAL_A UDITOR - Yes)
versus all other conditions

a A ll p -v alu es are tw o -ta ile d .

—

H3

2 .8 6 8

Table 10
A uditor Final-Inquiry W rite-D ow n
Panel A: Cell M eans (SD) [n] for FINAL_WD%

DUAL AUDITOR
D E C E P T IV E * D U A L A U D IT O R

Yes

No

Overall

50.29
(40.56)
[17]

41.18
(31.43)
[19]

45.49
(35.80)
[36]

No

40.71
(37.17)
[19]

34.56
(35.40)
[17]

37.81
(35.96)
[36]

Overall

45.24
(38.55)
[36]

38.06
(33.05)
[36]

41.65
(35.83)
[72]

D E C E P T IV E
Yes

Panel B: ANCOVA R esults for F IN A L_W D %
Factor
IN Q U IRY
AC C O U N T
P R E WD%
D ISCUSSIO N
NERVO US
DECEPTIVE
DUAL AUDITOR
DECEPTIVE * D UAL AU D ITO R

Hvnothesis

SS
0.245
0.009
0.891
0.412
0.619
0.373
0.025
0.069

df

Adi. R-sq
0.252

SS
3.065

df

Hvnothesis

SS
0.491

—

—
—

—
—

—
—
—

M odel Summary

MS
0.245
0.009
0.891
0.412
0.619
0.373
0.025
0.069

F
n-valuea
2.550 0.115
0.096 0.757
9.279 0.003
4.286 0.043
6.448 0.014
3.887 0.053
0.257 0.614
0.718 0.400

MS
0.383

F
3.988

p-value

8

df
3

MS
0.164

F
1.703

p-valuea
0.176
0.757

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0 .0 0 1

Panel C: Helm ert C ontrast Results
Contrast
Overall
(D E C E P T IV E - Yes *
DUAL AU D ITO R - Yes)
versus all other conditions

—

H3

3 A ll p-v alu es are tw o -ta ile d .
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M ed iatio n A nalysis - E stim atio n o f D ire c t Effects
P an el A: D IS C U S S IO N as D ep en d en t V ariable
V ariab le
CO NSTANT
IN Q U IRY
AC C O U N T
P R E WD%
DECEPTIVE
D UAL AUDITOR
DECEPTIVE * DUAL AU D ITO R
M odel S u m m ary

Effect
4.7710
-0.1483
0.9574
0.5946
-3.7262
-0.6003
2.2365
R-sq
0.2015

SE
1.5727
0.4682
0.4567
0.7787
1.4161
0.6360
0.9067
F
2.7344

t
3.0337
-0.3168
2.0965
0.7636
-2.6312
-0.9439
2.4666
C d fl
6 .0 0 0 0

p-value 2
0.0035
0.7524
0.0399
0.4478
0.0106
0.3487
0.0163
d f2
65.0000

p-value
0.0197

P an el B: N E R V O U S as D ep en d en t V ariable
V ariab le
CO NSTANT
IN Q U IRY
ACCOUNT
P R E WD%
D ECEPTIVE
D UAL AUDITOR
D ECEPTIVE * D UAL AU D ITO R
M odel S um m ary

Effect
2.8972
-0.5393
0.5162
-0.0168
-1.9630
0.3766
1.6832
R-sq
0.1816

SE
1.5811
0.4707
0.4591
0.7828
1.4238
0.6395
0.9116
F
2.4037

t
1.8323
-1.1456
1.1243
-0.0214
-1.3788
0.5890
1.8464
d fl
6 .0 0 0 0

p-value
0.0715
0.2561
0.2650
0.9830
0.1727
0.5579
0.0694
d f2
65.0000

p-value
0.0369

P anel C: F IN A L _W D % as D ep en d en t V ariable
V ariab le
CO NSTAN T
IN Q U IR Y
ACCOUNT
P R E WD%
D ISCU SSIO N
N ERVO U S
D ECEPTIVE
D UAL AUDITOR
D ECEPTIVE * DUAL AU D ITO R
M odel S u m m ary

a A il p -v a lu e s are tw o -taiied .

Effect
-0.2420
-0.1260
0.0246
0.3975
0.0431
0.0526
0.3598
0.0275
-0.1364
R-sq
0.3362

SE
0.2847
0.0789
0.0792
0.1305
0.0208
0.0207
0.2506
0.1072
0.1610
F
3.9878

t
-0.8~500
-1.5969
0.3102
3.0461
2.0702
2.5394
1.4355
0.2566
-0.8474
d fl
8 .0 0 0 0

p-value
0.3986
0.1153
0.7574
0.0034
0.0425
0.0136
0.1561
0.7983
0.4000
d f2
63.0000

0.0007

T ab le 12
M ediation A nalysis - C o n d itio n al D irect a n d In d ire c t Effects
P a n e l A: C on d itio n al D irect E ffect o f D E C E P T IV E on F IN A L _ WD% a t V alues of
DUAL__AUDITOR
D U A L A U D IT O R
Yes
No

E ffect
0.0869
0.2233

SE
0.1151
0.1100

t
0.7554
2.0299

p -v alu ea
0.4528
0.0466

P an el B: C on d itio n al In d ire c t E ffect o f D E C E P T IV E on F IN A L J V D % a t V alues of
D U A L jlU D IT O R b
A s M ediated by D IS C U S S IO N
D U A L A U D IT O R
Yes
No

E ffect
0,0322*
-0.0642**

SEtBoof)
0.0300
0.0509

B ootL L C I
0.0009
-0.1922

B ootU L C I
0.1085
-0.0130

Effect
0.0738**
-0.0147

SEtBooU
0.0486
0.0421

B o o tL L C I
0.0203
-0.0909

B ootU L C I
0.1817
0.0463

A s M ediated by N E R V O U S
D U A L A U D IT O R
Yes
No

P an el C : In d ire c t E ffect o f D E C E P T IV E * D U A L_A U D ITO R on F IN A L _W D% b
A s M ediated by D IS C U S S IO N
A s M ediated by N E R V O U S

Effect
0.0964**
0.0885**

SEtB oot)
0.0671
0.0711

B o o tL L C I
0.0258
0.0142

B ootU L C I
0.2566
0.2537

a A ll p-values are two-tailed.
b B ias-corrected 90 percent bootstrap confidence intervals are displayed. * indicates significance at p < 0.10
(90 percent confidence intervals do not contain zero). ** indicates significance at p < .05 (95 percent
confidence intervals, not displayed, do n ot contain zero).
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Table 13
ANCOVA A nalysis - 77? U T H SC O R E Categorization
P an el A: A N CO V A R esults fo r D IS C U S S IO N
F a c to r
H ypothesis
SS
IN Q U IR Y
1.636
ACCOUNT
16.966
CO NEXP
0.825
TRU TH SCORE
2.170
D UAL AUDITOR
3.038
T R U T H J C O R E * DUAL AU D ITO R
—
21.128
—

df
1

—

—

1

—

1

—

SS
54.020

F
p-valuea
0.452 0.504
4.691 0.035
0.228 0.635
0.600 0.442
0.840 0.363
5.841
0.019

6

MS
9.003

F
2.489

p-value
0.033

SS
29.112

df
3

MS
9.704

F
2.683

p-value
0.055
0.013

F a c to r
H ypothesis
SS
IN Q U IR Y
—
9.398
ACCOUNT
—
6.940
CO N EXP
—
16.687
T RU TH SCO RE
—
3.401
D UAL AUDITOR
—
19.246
TR U TH SC O RE * D UAL_A UDITOR —
16.761

df

MS
9.398
6.940
16.687
3.401
19.246
16.761

F
2.931
2.164
5.204
1.061
5.227

p-value
0.092
0.147
0.026
0.307
0.017
0.026

M odel S u m m ary

df
6

MS
11.159

F
3.480

p-value
0.005

df
3

MS
12.390

F
3.864

p-value
0.014
0.003

M o d el S u m m ary

A di. R -sa
0.124

1
1

MS
1.636
16.966
0.825
2.170
3.038
21.128

df

P an el B: H elm ert C o n tra s t R esu lts fo r D IS C U S S IO N
C o n tra s t
Overall
(D E C E P T IV E -Y e s *
D UAL AUDITOR - No)
versus all other conditions

H ypothesis
HI

P an el C : ANCO V A R esults fo r N E R V O U S

A di. R -sa
0.191

SS
66.952

1
1

1

6 .0 0 2

P an el D: H elm ert C o n tra s t R esu lts fo r N E R V O U S
C o n tra s t
O verall
(D E C E P T IV E -Y e s *
DUAL_A UDITOR - Yes)
versus all other conditions
a A ll p -v a lu e s a re tw o -tailed .

H ypothesis
SS
—
37.171
H2

T able 13 - (Continued)
ANCOVA A nalysis - TR UTH SCORE Categorization
Panel E: ANCOVA Results for FINAL WD%
Factor
Hypothesis
IN Q U IR Y
ACCOUNT
CONEXP
P R E WD%
D ISCU SSIO N
N ER VO U S
TRU TH SCO RE
D UAL AU D ITO R
TRU TH J C O R E *D UAL _A UDITOR —
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

M odel Summary

A di. R-sq
0.273

p-value
0.028
0.932
0.418
0.007
0.133
0.076

SS
0.476

df
1

MS
0.476

0 .0 0 1

1

0 .0 0 1

0.062
0.733
0.217
0.305
0.535

1

1

0.062
0.733
0.217
0.305
0.535

0 .0 1 1

1

0 .0 1 1

F
5.110
0.007
0.667
7.862
2.333
3.268
5.738
0.117

0 .0 0 0

1

0 .0 0 0

0 .0 0 2

SS
3.044

df
9

MS
0.338

F
3.628

p-value

df
3

MS
0.192

F
2.061

p-value
0.116
0.295

1
1
1

0 .0 2 0

0.734
0.967

0 .0 0 1

Panel F: Helm ert Contrast Results for FINAL_ WD%
__________________
C ontrast
Overall
(DECEPTIVE - Yes *
DUAL_A UDITOR - Yes)
versus all other conditions

H ypothesis SS
—
0.576
H3

Table 14
ANCOVA Analysis - CON_WD% Categorization
Panel A: ANCOVA Results for D IS C U S S IO N
Factor
IN Q U IRY
CO N AG E
CONEXP
C O N WD%
DUAL AU D ITO R
CO N_W D% * D U A L jiU D IT O R
M odel Sum mary

H vnothesis
—

—

—

—
—
—

A di. R-sa
0.042

SS
0.062
0.028
0.745
0.522
4.971
19.966

df

SS
35.789

df

1
1
1
1
1
1

MS
0.062
0.028
0.745
0.522
4.971
19.966

F
n-value8
0.015 0.903
0.007 0.935
0.179 0.674
0.126 0.725
1.194 0.279
4.797 0.033

6

MS
5.965

F
1.433

n-value
0.219

SS
28.510

df
3

MS
9.503

F
2.283

n-value
0.089
0.026

SS
1.761
2.843
9.396
6.406
26.288
13.058

df

MS
1.761
2.843
9.396
6.406
26.288
13.058

F
0.533
0.860
2.843
1.939
7.955
3.952

n-value
0.468
0.358
0.098
0.170
0.007
0.052

SS
62.512

df

MS
10.419

F
3.153

n-value

6

df
3

MS
15.161

F
4.588

n-value
0.006

Panel B: H elm ert Contrast Results for D IS C U S S IO N
Contrast
Overall
(D E C E P T IV E -Y e s *
DUAL_A UDITOR - No)
versus all other conditions

Hvnothesis
—

HI

Panel C: ANCO VA Results for N E R V O U S
Factor
IN Q U IR Y
CO N AG E
CO NEXP
C O N WD%
D UAL AU D ITO R
C O N _ W D % * DUAL AUDITOR
M odel Sum mary

Hvnothesis
—

—

—
—
—
—

A di. R-sq
0.177

1
1
1
1
1
1

0 .0 1 0

Panel D: H elm ert Contrast Results for N E R V O U S
C ontrast
Overall
(D E C E P T IV E -Y e s *
DUAL__A UDITOR - Yes)
versus all other conditions

Hvnothesis
H2

a A ll p -v a lu e s are tw o -tailed .
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SS
45.482

0 .0 0 1

Table 14 - (Continued)
ANCOVA Analysis - CON_WD% Categorization
Panel E: A NC O V A Results for FINAL_WD%
Factor
IN Q U IR Y
CO NAG E
CONEXP
PRE WD%
D ISC U SSIO N
N ER VO U S
C O N WD%
D UAL AU D ITO R
CO N_W D% * DUAL_A UDITOR
M odel Sum mary

1

MS
0.269
0.226
0.263
0.583
0.308
0.195
0.226

F
2.738
2.305
2.676
5.946
3.143
1.992
2.306

1

0 .0 0 0

0 .0 0 2

0.006

1

0.006

0.065

p-value
0.104
0.135
0.108
0.018
0.082
0.164
0.135
0.968
0.799

SS
2.542

df
9

MS
0.282

F
2.879

p-value
0.008

df
3

MS
0.082

F
0.839

p-value
0.479
0.510

ss
0.269
0.226
0.263
0.583
0.308
0.195
0.226

df

—

0 .0 0 0

—

Hypothesis
—
—

—

—
—

—
—

A di. R-sa
0 .2 2 0

1
1
1
1
1
1

Panel F: H elm ert Contrast Results for FINAL_ WD%0
Contrast
Overall
(D ECEPTIVE - Yes *
D UA L _A UDITOR - Yes)
versus all other conditions

H ypothesis
—

H3
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SS
0.247

Table 15
Perceived Skepticism - Correlations8’5

1. C O N
2. C O N
3.A U D
4 .A U D
5. A U D

H O N E ST
BELIEVE
H O N E ST
VALID
CO NVINCE

1
1.000
0.510**
0.128
0.161
0.197

2

3

4

1.000
0.103
0.417**
0.383**

1.000
0.622**
0.560**

1.000
0.824**

5

1.000

a * and ** indicate that the estim ated coefficients are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively (two-tailed).
b Pearson correlations.
V ariable D efinitions:
C O N _H O N E ST - C ontroller assessm ent o f how honest he/she appeared to auditor(s) (1 = not at all
honest, 9 = very honest);
C O N B E L IE VE ~ C ontroller assessm ent o f the extent to w hich auditor(s) believed his/her
argum ents (1 = auditors did n ot believe my argum ents at all, 9 = auditors fully believed
m y argum ents);
A U D _ H O N E S T - A uditor assessm ent o f controller’s honesty (1 - not at all honest, 9 = very
honest):
A U D JV A L ID - A uditor assessm ent o f the extent to w hich controller argum ents w ere valid (1 = not
at all valid, 9 = very valid);
A U D _C O N V IN C E - A uditor assessm ent o f the extent to w hich controller argum ents w ere
convincing (1 = not at all convincing), 9 = very convincing).
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Table 16
A C ontrast o f C ontrollers’ and A uditors’ perceptions o f Controller D iscussion and
Nervousness - Correlationsa,b
1
1.
2.
3.
4.

CON DISCUSSION
CON NERVOUS
DISCUSSION
NERVOUS

2

3

4

1 .0 0 0

-0.335**
0.189
-0.244*

1 .0 0 0

-0.169
0.387**

1 .0 0 0

-0.228**

1 .0 0 0

a * and ** indicate that the estim ated coefficients are significant at 0.05 and 0,01 respectively (tw o-tailed).
b P earson correlations.
V ariable D efinitions:
C O N ^D ISC U SSIO N - A uditor assessm ent o f the extent to w hich discussion w as led by controller
(1 = led mostly by auditor(s), 9 = led mostly by controller);
C O N _N E R VO US - A uditor assessm ent o f controller nervousness (1 = N o t at all nervous, 9 = Very
nervous);
D ISC U SSIO N - A uditor assessm ent o f the extent to w hich discussion was led by controller (1 =
led m ostly by auditor(s), 9 = led m ostly by controller);
N E R V O U S - A uditor assessm ent o f controller nervousness (1 - N o t a t all nervous, 9 = Very
nervous).
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T ab le 17
A NC O V A Analysis Using C ontroller’s Assessm ents o f Discussion and
Nervousness
Panel A: A NC O V A Results for CON DISCUSSION
Factor
INQ U IRY
AC C O U N T
DECEPTIVE
DUAL AU D ITO R
DECEPTIVE * DUAL AUDITOR
M odel Sum mary

Hypothesis
—

—

SS
0.317
8.015

df
1

MS
0.317
8.015

F
p-value3
0.105 0.747
2.652 0.108
3.595 0.062
0 .1 2 1
0.729
3.857 0.054

—

1 0 .8 6 6

1

1 0 .8 6 6

—

0.366
11.659

1
1

0.366
11.659

SS
37.370

df
5

MS
7.474

F
2.473

p-value
0.041

df
3

MS
7.188

F
2.378

p-value
0.078
0.817

SS

df

MS

1 .0 2 1

1

1

3.300
2.215
1.570
10.786

F
0.281
0.909
0.610
0.433
2.972

p-value
0.598
0.344
0.437
0.513
0.089

df
5

MS
4.218

F
1.162

p-value
0.337

MS
4.576

F
1.261

p-value
0.295
0.086

—

A di. R-sa
0.094

Panel B: H elm ert C ontrast Results for CON_DISCUSSION
Contrast
Overall
(D ECEPTIVE - Yes *
D UAL_A UDITOR - No)
versus all other conditions

Hypothesis
—

SS
21.565

HI

Panel C: A N C O V A Results for CON^NERVOUS
Factor
IN Q U IR Y
ACCOUNT
D ECEPTIVE
DUAL AU D ITO R
D ECEPTIVE * D UAL AUDITOR
M odel Sum m ary

H ypothesis
—
—
—

—

—
A di. R-sq
0 .0 1 1

3.300
2.215
1.570
10.786
SS
21.089

1
1

1 .0 1 2

Panel D: H elm ert C ontrast Results for CON NER VOUS
Contrast
Overall
(D EC EPTIVE - Yes *
DUAL_A UDITOR - Yes)
versus all other conditions

a A ll p -v a lu e s are tw o -ta ile d .

Hypothesis
H2

SS
13.728

df
3

Table 1 7 -(C o n tin u e d )
ANCO VA A nalysis Using Controller’s A ssessm ents of Discussion and Nervousness
Panel E: A N C O V A Results for F IN A L _W D %
Factor
IN Q U IRY
AC C O U N T
PRE WD%
C O N D ISC U SSIO N
C O N N ERVO U S
DECEPTIVE
DUAL AU D ITO R
DECEPTIVE * D UAL AUDITOR
M odel Sum mary

Hypothesis
—

—

—
—
—
—

—
—

Adi. R-sa
0.143

SS
0.371
0.068
0.924
0.127
0.072
0.296
0.024

df

1

MS
0.371
0.068
0.924
0.127
0.072
0.296
0.024

0 .0 0 2

1

0 .0 0 2

F
p-value3
3.367 0.071
0.619 0.434
8.399 0.005
1.158 0.286
0.650 0.423
2.694 0.106
0 .2 2 1
0.640
0 .0 2 1
0.885

SS
2.183

df
8

MS
0.273

F
2.480

df
3

MS
0.107

F
0.976

1
1
1
1
1
1

p-value
0 .0 2 1

Panel F: H elm ert C ontrast Results for FINAL_WD%
Contrast________________________ Hypothesis
Overall
—
(D ECEPTIVE - Yes *
H3
D UAL AU D ITO R - Yes)
versus all other conditions

RA ll p -v a lu e s a re tw o -ta ile d .
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SS
0.322

p-value
0.410
0.287
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